2017 Notes On Criminal Law Procedure And Evidence

Transcript

CASE UPDATES IN CRIMINAL LAW, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE & EVIDENCE CRIMINAL LAW QUALIFIED THEFT The elements of the crime of theft are as follows: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the. taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. Theft becomes qualified when any of the following circumstances under Article 310 is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a plantation; (5) the property stolen· is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil disturbance. People of the Philippines v. Luther Sabado et al., G.R. No. 218910, July 5, 2017. The elements aforementioned were all alleged and proved. First, there was a taking of personal property consisting of pieces of jewelry, i.e. two men's rings and one necklace with pendant. Second, said pieces of jewelry belong to the Pawnshop. Third, the taking of said pieces of jewelry was with intent to gain. Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. Fourth, the taking was obviously without the consent of the Pawnshop; and, Fifth, the taking was accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. People of the Philippines v. Luther Sabado et al., G.R. No. 218910, July 5, 2017. Theft here became qualified because it was committed with grave abuse of confidence. Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of theft, must be the result of the relation by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the accused-appellant and the offended party that might create a high degree of confidence between them which the accused-appellant abused. Accused-appellant, as established by the prosecution, is an employee of the Pawnshop. Accused-appellant could not have committed the crime had he not been holding the position of the 1 trusted employee which gave him not only sole access to the Pawnshop's vault but also control of the premises. People of the Philippines v. Luther Sabado et al., G.R. No. 218910, July 5, 2017. The management of Diamond Pawnshop clearly had reposed its trust and confidence in the accused-appellant, and it was this trust and confidence which he exploited to enrich himself to the damage and prejudice of his employer. We view with disfavor accused-appellant's plea of acquittal on the ground that there exists. no evidence which linked him directly to or showed his participation in the robbery. He underscores in particular that nobody witnessed what transpired inside the pawnshop during the incident, hence, he must be excused from any criminal liability. This contention is unmeritorious because even if it was not shown that he personally took away the pieces of jewelry, his overt act of opening the steel gate, facilitating the entry of one of his co-accused inside the pawnshop, and opening of the vault despite his avowal that the vault was controlled by a time delay mechanism, showed his complicity in the commission of the crime charged. People of the Philippines v. Luther Sabado et al., G.R. No. 218910, July 5, 2017 KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION The elements of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three days; or (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. If the victim of kidnapping and serious illegal detention is a minor, the duration of his detention is immaterial. People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017. The essence of the crime of kidnapping is the actual deprivation of the victim's liberty, coupled with indubitable proof of the intent of the accused to effect the same. People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017. There is no dispute that accused-appellant is a private individual and that she took AAA from her school on March 2, 2006, brought her to Nueva Ecija and kept her there until she was arrested on March 5, 2006. That AAA was deprived of her liberty is clear from her testimony that despite her pleas for accused-appellant to let her go home, the latter refused. Accused-appellant, however, contends that AAA had not been deprived of liberty while in her custody. She argues that the records are bereft of any indication that AAA was physically restrained, or was under her constant 2 control, or was ever prevented from going home. She claims that during the period she had custody ofAAA, the latter was free to interact with third persons and communicate with her relatives, and was well taken care of. The argument fails. The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim's liberty need not involve any physical restraint upon the victim's person. For kidnapping to exist, it is not necessary that the offender kept the victim in an enclosure or treated him harshly. People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017. In People v. Bisda [G.R. No. 140895, July 17, 2003] the Court upheld the conviction of kidnapping for ransom even though the abducted five-year old child was, during her detention, free to roam around the place of detention, to practice on her drawing and to watch television, and was regularly fed and bathed. Citing United States v. McCabe [812 F. 2d. 1660 (1987)] the Court stated that "to accept a child's desire for food, comfort as the type of will or consent contemplated in the context of kidnapping would render the concept meaningless." Should the child even want to escape, said the Court, she could not do so all by herself given her age; she was under the control of her abductors and was merely waiting and hoping that she would be brought home or that her parents would fetch her. People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017. Nine-year old AAA was brought by accused-appellant to a place unfamiliar to her. 19 In fact, she learned that the name of the place was Nueva Ecija only after she was rescued. Leaving a child in a place from which he did not know the way home, even if he had the freedom to roam around the place of detention, would still amount to deprivation of liberty. Under such a situation, the child's freedom remains at the mercy and control of the abductor. The RTC, thus, correctly held that even in the absence of evidence that AAA was locked up, she was still deprived of her liberty because considering her minority and the distance between her home and Nueva Ecija, she could not possibly go back home to YYY without accused-appellant's assistance. People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017. KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following elements: "[first,] the accused was a private person; [second,] he [or she] kidnapped or detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or detention was illegal; and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom." People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. 3 Badges or Shields not a Ground for Immunity from Prosecution Accused-appellants claim that they were agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency's Task Force Hunter but were unable to present any evidence to substantiate their claim. The prosecution, however, was able to present Police Inspector Nabor of the Human Resource Service of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, who testified that accused-appellants"[were] not in any manner connected with [Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency]." It also submitted to the trial court a letter sent by P/Supt. Edwin Nemenzo of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency to Philippine National Police P/Sr. Supt. Allan Purisima stating that the accusedappellants were not agents of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency. Nonetheless, even if they were employed by the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, detaining any private person for the purpose of extorting any amount of money could not, in any way, be construed as within their official functions. If proven, they can be guilty of serious illegal detention. Their badges or shields do not give them immunity for any criminal act. People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. The prosecution was likewise able to prove that Rizaldo was illegally deprived of his liberty. The undisputed facts establish that on August 1, 2004, around midnight, Rizaldo was in his vehicle being followed by accused-appellants along Evangelista Street. When he alighted from his vehicle near the police station, accused-appellant Avancena approached him and implied that he was involved in the sale of illegal drugs. Accusedappellant boarded his vehicle and told Rizaldo to drive, with the rest of the accused-appellants following in their vehicle. Upon reaching the comer of Lacuna and Evangelista Streets, accused-appellant Avancena took over the steering wheel. Accused-appellant Taytay boarded the vehicle and handcuffed Rizaldo and they drove to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot in Malate. Accused-appellant Popioco and Nazareno also boarded the vehicle. They drove around for a while in the Manila and Makati areas but eventually returned to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot. While on board, accused-appellant Taytay tried to strangle Rizaldo while accused-appellant Popioco punched him. People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was "forcefully transported, locked up or restrained." It must be proven that the accused intended "to deprive the victim of his liberty." The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming him to prevent escape falls under this definition. Accusedappellants, however, claim that Rizaldo was not kidnapped because he voluntarily went with the accused-appellants. People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. 4 "[T]he fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused [does] not remove the element of deprivation of liberty [if] the victim went with the accused on a false inducement without which the victim would not have done so." Rizaldo would not have gone with the accused-appellants had they not misrepresented themselves as Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs. People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. Accused-appellants also told Rizaldo that he would only be released if Alfonso paid them PIS0,000.00. "The act of holding a person for a proscribed purpose necessarily implies an unlawful physical or mental restraint against the person's will, and with a willful intent to so confine the victim." If Rizaldo was indeed free to leave, there would have been no reason for Alfonso to come rushing to his son's aid. Rizaldo was also able to come home only after Alfonso negotiated his release. Taken together, the prosecution was able to establish the elements of kidnapping for ransom, which is punishable under the Revised Penal Cod with death. Considering the suspension of the death penalty, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT Illegal recruitment is "committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes." Illegal recruitment may be undertaken by either nonlicense or license holders. Non-license holders are liable by the simple act of engaging in recruitment and placement activities, while license holders may also be held liable for committing the acts prohibited under Section 6 of RA 8042. People of the Philippines v. Erlinda A. sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017 Under RA 8042, a non-licensee or non-holder of authority commits illegal recruitment for overseas employment in two ways: (1) by any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and includes referring, contract services, promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not; or (2) by undertaking any of the acts enumerated under Section 6 of RA 8042.People of the Philippines v. Erlinda A. sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017. The Court has held in several cases that an accused who represents to others that he or she could send workers abroad for employment, even without the authority or license to do so, commits illegal recruitment. It is the absence of the necessary license or authority to recruit and deploy workers that renders the recruitment activity unlawful. To prove illegal recruitment, it must be shown that "the accused 5 gave the complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to deploy the complainants abroad in a manner that they were convinced to part with their money for that end.People of the Philippines v. Erlinda A. sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017 On the other hand, illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate, as in the present case, has the following elements: (a) the offender does not have the valid license or authority required by law to engage in recruitment and placement of workers; (b) the offender undertakes any of the "recruitment and placement" activities defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or engages in any of the prohibited practices enumerated under now Section 6 of RA 8042; and (c) the illegal recruitment is "carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme." In the third element, it "is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective." People of the Philippines v. Erlinda A. sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017 We agree with the trial court and the CA that the prosecution was able to establish that appellant was engaged in illegal recruitment in large scale. It was proved that appellant was a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to recruit workers for deployment abroad; she offered or promised employment abroad to private complainants; she received monies from private complainants purportedly as placement or processing fees; that private complainants were not actually deployed to Brunei; that despite demands, appellant failed to reimburse or refund to private complainants their monies; and that appellant committed these prohibited acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. To recall, private complainants Pomar, Pastolero, Cathedral, Orias, Suobiron, Bueron, and Pelipog testified that appellant went to Pavia, Iloilo and represented herself as a recruiter who could send them to Brunei for work; that appellant impressed upon them that she had the authority or ability to send them overseas for work by showing them a job order from Brunei and a calling card; and appellant collected processing or placement fees from the private complainants in various amounts ranging from PS,000.00 to P20,000.00; and that she did not reimburse said amounts despite demands. In addition, it was proved that appellant does not have any license or authority to recruit workers for overseas employment as shown by the certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. People of the Philippines v. Gilda Abellanosa, G.R. No. 214340, July 19, 2017 The acts of Sison, Dedales, and Bacomo show a common purpose and and each undertook a part to reach their objective. Their concerted action is evident in that either Sison or Dedales was receiving payments from the recruits; that Dedales signed the acknowledgment receipt from Sison; and that the three accompanied their recruits 6 together in seeking out their visas in Malaysia and Indonesia. Further, the impression given to Castuera and other recruits was that the three were indeed working together. Since it was proven that the three accused were acting in concert and conspired with one another, their illegal recruitment activity is considered done by a syndicate, making the offense illegal recruitment involving economic sabotage. People of the Philippines v. Erlinda A. sison, G.R. No. 187160, August 9, 2017. CONSPIRACY [ABSENCE OF] We stress that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the furtherance of the common design or purpose. Likewise, where the only act attributable to the other accused is an apparent readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy. In this case, while accused-appellant's presence and act of pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime or that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no conspiracy. People of the Philippines v. Roberto Jesalva, G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017. We emphasize that the prosecution must establish conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt. A conviction premised on a finding of conspiracy must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences and presumption. Conspiracy is not a harmless innuendo to be taken lightly or accepted at every tum. It is a legal concept that imputes culpability under specific circumstances. As such, it must be established as clearly as any element of the crime. The quantum of evidence to be satisfied is, we repeat, beyond reasonable doubt. In the absence of conspiracy, accused-appellant is responsible only for the consequences of his own acts. In this case, all that accusedappellant did was to stare and point at the victim and his companions. These, however, are NOT crimes. People of the Philippines v. Roberto Jesalva, G.R. No. 227306, June 19, 2017. CARNAPPING Three amendments have been made to the original Section 14 of the AntiCarnapping Act: (1) the penalty of life imprisonment was changed to reclusion perpetua, (2) the inclusion of rape, and (3) the change of the phrase "in the commission of the carnapping" to "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" This third amendment clarifies the law's intent to make the offense a special complex crime, by way of analogy vis-a-vis paragraphs 1 to 4 of the Revised Penal Code on robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons. Thus, under the last clause of Section 14 of the Anti-Carnapping Act, the prosecution has to prove 7 the essential requisites of carnapping and of the homicide or murder of the victim, and more importantly, it must show that the original criminal design of the culprit was carnapping and that the killing was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof" Consequently, where the elements of carnapping are not proved, the provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act would cease to be applicable and the homicide or murder (if proven) would be punishable under the Revised Penal Code. People of the Philippines v. Jeffrey Macaranas, G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017 To prove the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof. In this particular case, all the elements are present as the pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution show that there were two (2) men both wearing jackets and bonnets, together with the appellant who approached the victim and the witness Kathlyn and employed force and intimidation upon them and thereafter forcibly took the victim's motorcycle and then shot the victim on the neck causing his death. People of the Philippines v. Jeffrey Macaranas, G.R. No. 226846, June 21, 2017. SIMPLE ROBBERY The elements of simple robbery are "a) that there is personal property belonging to another; b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is with intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things." People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by means of intimidation. "Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if [the offender] has no opportunity to dispose of the [thing]." The marked money was recovered from the accusedappellants when they were arrested, which proves that they were able to gain possession of Alfonso's money. Accused-appellants, however, counter that the ultraviolet powder dusted on the marked money was found on their faces, not their hands. This detail is irrelevant. A number of events could have transpired from the time NAKTAF agents apprehended the Toyota Revo up to the time the accusedappellants were handcuffed and brought to Camp Crame, including the possibility that the accused-appellants simply wiped their hands clean. What is essential is that the prosecution was able to establish that at the time of their arrest, the marked money was recovered from the accused-appellants. People of the Philippines v. Elmer Avancena et al, G.R. No. 200512, June 7, 2017. 8 ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE The elements of the special complex crime of robbery with homicide are: "(1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use ofviolence or intimidation against a person; (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. x x x The robbery is the [main] purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery." The prosecution successfully established these elements. Appellant, together with his three companions, boarded the public utility jeepney and declared a "hold-up". The passengers, including Sandagan, were forced at gunpoint to turnover their cash and possessions. When Cerbito refused to be divested of his cellphone, appellant kicked him three or four times with such force that he fell off the jeepney. Still dissatisfied with the violence he vented on Cerbito, appellant fired at him twice, hitting him in his chest and abdomen resulting in his untimely death. Appellant and his three cohort." then fled together with their loot. Undoubtedly, their main objective was to rob the passengers of the jeepney; the fatal shooting of Cerbito was merely incidental, resulting by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery. Appellant therefore committed the crime of robbery with homicide as charged in the Information. People of the Philippines v. Mark Gamba, G.R. No. 215332, July 24, 2017 PARRICIDE The promise of forever is not an authority for the other to own one's spouse. If anything, it is an obligation to love and cherish despite his or her imperfections. To be driven to anger, rage, or murder due to jealousy is not a manifestation of this sacred understanding. One who professes love should act better than this. The accusedappellant was never entitled to hurt, maim, or kill his spouse, no matter the reasons. He committed a crime. He must suffer its consequences. People of the Philippines v. Abenir Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017 With respect to the killing by the accused of his wife, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw her father hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of the incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused. Well settled is the rule that it is unnatural for a relative, in this case the accused's own child, who is interested in vindicating the crime, to accuse somebody else other than the real culprit. For her to do so is to let the guilty go free. Where there is nothing to indicate that witnesses were actuated by improper motives on the witness stand, their positive declarations made under solemn oath deserve full faith and credence. People of the Philippines v. Abenir Brusola, G.R. No. 210615, July 26, 2017. 9 SYNDICATED ESTAFA The elements of Syndicated Estafa, are as follows: (a) Esta/a or other forms of swindling, as defined in Articles 315 and 316 of the RPC, is committed; (b) the Esta/a or swindling is committed by a syndicate of five (5) or more persons; and (c) the defraudation results in the misappropriation of moneys contributed by stockholders, or members of rural banks, cooperatives, "samahang nayon(s)," or farmers' associations, or of funds solicited by corporations/associations from the general public. People of the Philippines v. Rosario Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017 Using Multitel as their conduit, Baladjay and her more than five (5) counselors employed deceit and falsely pretended to have the authority to solicit investments from the general public when, in truth, they did not have such authority. The deception continued when Baladjay's counselors actively solicited investments from the public, promising very high interest returns starting at five percent (5%) per month. Convinced of Baladjay's and her counselors' promise of lucrative income, the private complainants were then enticed to invest in Multitel. However, unknown to them, the promised high-yielding venture was unsustainable, as Multitel was not really engaged in any legitimate business. Eventually, Baladjay and her cohorts ran away with the private complainants' money causing them damage and prejudice. People of the Philippines v. Rosario Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017 Clearly, all the elements of Syndicated Esta/a obtain in this case, considering that: (a) more than five (5) persons are involved in Multitel's grand fraudulent scheme, including Baladjay and her co-accused - who employed deceit, false pretenses and representations to the private complainants regarding a supposed lucrative investment opportunity with Multitel in order to solicit money from them~ (b) the said false pretenses and representations were made prior to or simultaneous with the commission of fraud; (c) relying on the false promises and misrepresentations thus employed, private complainants invested their hard-earned money in Multitel; and (d) Baladjay and her co-accused defrauded the private complainants, obviously to the latter's prejudice. People of the Philippines v. Rosario Baladjay, G.R. No. 220458, July 26, 2017 ESTAFA IN ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and (2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation. Here, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accusedappellant deceived private complainants into believing that she had the authority and capability to send them abroad for employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to recruit workers for 10 overseas employment. Because of the assurances given by accused-appellant, the private complainants parted with their hard-earned money for the payment of the agreed placement fee, for which accused-appellant issued petty cash vouchers and used fictitious names evidencing her receipt of the payments. People of the Philippines v. Merceditas Matheus, G.R. No. 198795, June 9, 2017 ILLEGAL SALE OF DANGEROUS DRUGS For a successful prosecution of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, the following elements must be satisfactorily established by the State, namely: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the delivery of the illicit drug to the poseurbuyer and the receipt by the seller of the marked money consummate the illegal transaction. What matters is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the prohibited drug, the corpus delicti, as evidence. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Geronimo, G.R. No.180447, August 23, 2017 In every prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State carries the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense, failing in which the State would not discharge its basic duty of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. If the State does not establish the corpus delicti, such as when the dangerous drug subject of the prosecution is missing, or when substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance raise grave doubts about the authenticity of the prohibited substance presented as evidence in court, then the crime is not established beyond reasonable doubt. Indeed, any substantial gap renders the case for the State less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the accused-appellant deserves acquittal due to the reasonable doubt that the lapses in the chain of custody engendered. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Geronimo, G.R. No.180447, August 23, 2017 CRIMINAL LIABILITY AND FREE WILL The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. Under the classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free will. Man is essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. When he commits a felonious or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, i.e., with freedom, intelligence and intent. Man, therefore, 11 should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears unimpaired. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary. The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal condition of a person. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity which exempts the actor from criminal liability. People of the Philippines v. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 INSANITY An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the accused to a mental institution. In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of entertaining a criminal intent." He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. People of the Philippines v. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017. Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it by clear and positive evidence. And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. To ascertain a persons mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required. Neither are specific acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. People of the Philippines v. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 "Diminished capacity" is not the same as "complete deprivation of intelligence or discernment." Mere abnormality of mental faculties does not exclude imputability. Thus, on the basis of these examinations, it is clearly evident that the defense failed to prove that appellant acted without the least discernment or that he was suffering from a complete absence of intelligence or the power to discern at the time of the commission of the crime. Furthermore, appellant's act of treachery, that is by 12 employing means and methods to ensure the killing of Francisco without risk to himself arising from the defense which the victim might make, as well as his subsequent reaction of immediately fleeing after his commission of the crime and, thereafter, evading arrest, is not the product of a completely aberrant mind. In other words, evidence points to the fact that appellant was not suffering from insanity immediately before, simultaneous to, and even right after the commission of the crime. People of the Philippines v. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 In his Supplemental Brief, appellant cites the "Durham Rule" which was used in criminal courts in the United States of America. This rule postulated that an accused is not criminally responsible if his unlawful act was the result of a mental disease or defect at the time of the incident. However, in subsequent rulings, US Federal Courts and State Courts, even by the court which originally adopted it, rejected and abandoned this rule for being too broad and for lacking a clear legal standard for criminal responsibility. As earlier discussed, in the Philippines, the courts have established a clearer and more stringent criterion for insanity to be exempting as it is required that there must be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, i.e., the accused is deprived of reason; he acted without the least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there is a total deprivation of the will. Thus, appellant's reliance on the Durham Rule is misplaced and, thus, may not be given credit. People of the Philippines v. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 TREACHERY Paragraph 16, Article 14 of the RPC defines treachery as the direct employment of means, methods, or forms in the execution of the crime against persons which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In order for treachery to be properly appreciated, two elements must be present: (1) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. These elements are extant in the facts of this case and as testified to by the prosecution witnesses. To emphasize, the victim, Francisco, was caught off guard when appellant attacked him. As testified to by a prosecution witness, Francisco was then holding a plastic container containing bread and was eating. The stealth, swiftness and methodical manner by which the attack was carried out gave the victim no chance at all to evade when appellant thrust the knife to his torso. Thus, there is no denying that appellant's sudden and unexpected onslaught upon the victim, and the fact that the former did not sustain any injury, evidences treachery. Also, the fact that appellant was facing Francisco when he stabbed the latter 13 is of no consequence. Even a frontal attack could be treacherous when unexpected and on an unarmed victim who would be in no position to repel the attack or avoid it, as in this case. Undoubtedly, the RTC and the CA correctly held that the crime committed was murder under Article 248 of the RPC by reason of the qualifying circumstance of treachery. People of the Philippines v. Roger Racal, G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 The attending circumstance of treachery was likewise properly appreciated. Treachery is present when the following conditions are present: (1) the employment of such means of execution that gave the one attacked no opportunity to defend oneself or to retaliate and (2) deliberate or conscious adoption of the means of execution. There is treachery when "the means used by the accused-appellants to insure the execution of the killing of the victims, so as to afford the victims no opportunity to defend themselves was the tying of the hands of the victims." In this case, it was correctly pointed out by the trial court that the fact that "the arms of the [victim] were held by [Leopoldo and Algel] when he was stabbed in the back by accused Toto Morales is enough to qualify the killing to murder. Further, the Court of Appeals added that "appellants' attack and their co-accused came without warning and without the slightest provocation from the victim." People of the Philippines v. Gabby Concepcion and Toto Morales, G.R. No. 212206, July 4, 2016 The qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery was correctly appreciated by the CA. In this case, treachery is evident from the fact that the victim could not have been aware of the imminent peril to his life. Mawac was obviously caught off-guard, unprepared for the sudden, unexpected and unprovoked attack on his person when Sabida surprisingly emerged from the road and hacked him with a bolo. The sudden and unexpected attack adopted by Sabida deprived the victim of any chance to defend himself or to retaliate. He had no foreboding of any danger, threat or harm upon his life at the said time, place and occasion. There was treachery not only because of the suddenness of the attack but also because of the absence of an opporunity on the victim's part to repel the attack. Without a doubt, the killing was attended by treachery. People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Sabida, G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017. Under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of murder is punishable by reclusion perpetua to death if committed with treachery. As correctly imposed by the trial court and as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, appellant must suffer the prison term of reclusion perpetua, the lower of the said two indivisible penalties, due to the absence of an aggravating circumstance attending the commission of the crime. Appellants are not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346. The awards of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages must however be increased to ~l 00,000.00 each in line with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition, interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all 14 monetary awards from date of finality of this Resolution until fully paid. People of the Philippines v. Gabby Concepcion and Toto Morales, G.R. No. 212206, July 4, 2016 LASCIVIOUS CONDUCT On the other hand, acts of lasciviousness under the RPC has the following elements: that the offender commits any act of lasciviousness or lewdness; that it is done by using force or intimidation, or when the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or when the offended party is under 12 years of age; and that the offended party is another person of either sex. People of the Philippines v. Dominador Udtohan, G.R. No. 228887, August 2, 2017 Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, the requisites of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness as penalized under Article 336 of the RPC above-enumerate must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610, as follows: (1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct; (2) the said act is perfonned with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse; and (3) that the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. A judicious examination of the records reveals that all the elements of the crime of Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 have been sufficiently established. The prosecution was able to prove AAA's minority at the time of the incident through the presentation of her Certificate of Live Birth40 showing that she was born on September 3, 1995. At the time of the commission of the lascivious act, AAA was then 12 years old. It was likewise established that accusedappellant, an adult who exercised influence on AAA, committed a lascivious act by "squeezing" her vagina. People of the Philippines v. Dominador Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017 After a careful evaluation, the Court finds that the mere fact of "squeezing" the private part of a child - a young girl 12 years of age - could not have signified any other intention but one having lewd or indecent design. It must not be forgotten that several years prior, accused-appellant had raped AAA in the same house, for which act he was appropriately convicted. Indeed, the law indicates that the mere touching - more so, "squeezing," in this case, which strongly suggests that the act was intentional - of AAA's genitalia clearly constitutes lascivious conduct. It could not have been done merely to annoy or vex her, as opined by the courts a quo. That AAA was fully clothed at that time, which led the courts a quo to believe that accusedappellant could not have intended to lie with her, is inconsequential. "'Lewd' is defined as obscene, lustful, indecent, and lecherous. It signifies that form of immorality which has relation to moral impurity; or that which is carried on a wanton manner." As such, accused-appellant's act of squeezing AAA's vagina was a lewd and 15 lascivious act within the definitions set by law and jurisprudence. People of the Philippines v. Dominador Ladra, G.R. No. 221443, July 17, 2017 CHILD ABUSE It is clear from the above that "AAA" need not be a child exploited in prostitution for money or profit in order for the provisions of RA 7160 to apply. As long as a child is subjected to sexual abuse, either by engaging in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, the penalty under Sec. 5 (b), Art. III ofRA 7610 shall be the proper imposable penalty. Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but also where one - through coercion, intimidation or influence - engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child. Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when he or she indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. Philippines v. Amante Padlan, G. R. No. 214880, September 6, 2017. RAPE Appellant further maintains that he and "AAA" have a romantic relationship. He proffers the "sweetheart theory" as a defense. But the Court "has decreed that even if the alleged romantic relationship were true, this fact does not necessarily negate rape for a man cannot demand sexual gratification from a fiancee and worse, employ violence upon her on the pretext of love because love is not a license for lust. People of the Philippines v. Nomerto Napoles, G.R. No. 215200, July 26, 2017 STATUTORY RAPE The rape of a minor constitutes moral depravity of the highest order. People of the Philippines v. Pablo Armodia, G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017. Under Article 266-A of the RPC, rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: [1] By using force, threat, or intimidation; [2] When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; [3] By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and [4] When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. [T]here is statutory rape when: "(1) the offended party is under [twelve] years of age ; and (2) the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or intimidation; whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the 16 victim is proven and that there was sexual intercourse. People of the Philippines v. Amante Padlan, G. R. No. 214880, September 6, 2017 This Court has consistently held that rape under Article 266-A(l)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is termed statutory rape as it departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes in statutory rape is carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve (12) years old. Thus, force, intimidation and physical evidence of injury are not relevant considerations; the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years; the child's consent is immaterial because of her presumed incapacity to discern good from evil. People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017. Statutory rape is committed by sexual intercourse with a woman below 12 years of age regardless of her consent, or the lack of it, to the sexual act. Proof of force, intimidation or consent is unnecessary as they are not elements of statutory rape, considering that the absence of free consent is conclusively presumed when the victim is below the age of 12. 11 Moreover, under Article 266-B of the RPC, there is qualified rape when the victim is below 18 years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim. People of the Philippines v. Dominador Udtohan, G.R. No. 228887, August 2, 2017. It is also a settled rule that sexual intercourse with a woman who is a mental retardate, with a mental age below 12 years old, constitutes statutory rape. If a mentally-retarded or intellectually-disabled person whose mental age is less than 12 years is raped, the rape is considered committed under paragraph 1 (d) and not paragraph l(b), Article 266-A of the RPC. People of the Philippines v. Rodolfo Deniega, G.R. No. 212201, June 28, 2017. The gravamen of rape under Article 266-A (1) is carnal knowledge of "a woman against her will or without her consent." Undoubtedly, sexual intercourse with an intellectually disabled person is rape since proof of force or intimidation becomes needless as the victim is incapable of giving consent to the act. One's capacity to give consent depends upon his or her mental age and not on his or her chronological age. AAA's intellectual disability was undisputed and well substantiated by the testimonies of Tablizo and Dr. Acosta. The defense did not even contest her condition. People of the Philippines v. Edgar Allan Corpuz, G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017. If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts. The reason behind the rule "is simply that if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age 17 is rape, it must thereby follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child below twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape." People of the Philippines v. Edgar Allan Corpuz, G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017. QUALIFIED RAPE The Court likewise cannot subscribe to the assertion of [the Accused] that his moral ascendancy as a stepparent is 'insufficient to replace force, violence or intimidation in the crime of rape. Jurisprudence dictates that the moral ascendancy wielded by De Guzman as a stepfather substituted actual force, threat and intimidation. People of the Philippines v. Romeo De Guzman, G.R. No. 228248, August 9, 2017. It is likewise settled that in cases where the rape is committed by a close kin, such as the victim's father, stepfather, uncle, or the common-law spouse of her mother, it is not necessary that actual force or intimidation be employed; moral influence or ascendancy takes the place of violence or intimidation. People of the Philippines v. Noel Go Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017 SIMPLE RAPE The Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Court found that accusedappellant's relationship with AAA was not duly alleged in the informations. Thus, his relationship with the victim cannot qualify the crimes of rape. Ruling otherwise would deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of accusation against him. The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B(1)48 of the Revised Penal Code consists of the twin circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the perpetrator, both of which must concur and must b alleged in the information. It is immaterial whether the relationship was proven during trial if that was not specifically pleaded for in the information. People of the Philippines v. Pablo Armodia, G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017. Simple rape is punishable by reclusion perpetua. Even if the aggravating circumstances of minority and relationship were present, the appropriate penalty would still be reclusion perpetua under the law. Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "in all cases in which the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty, it shall be applied by the courts regardless of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the deed. People of the Philippines v. Pablo Armodia, G.R. No. 210654, June 7, 2017. 18 FORCIBLE ABDUCTION WITH RAPE Under Article 342 of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of forcible abduction are: (1) the taking of a woman against her will; and (2) with lewd designs. The crime of forcible abduction with rape is a complex crime that occurs when the abductor has carnal knowledge of the abducted woman under the following circumstances: (1) by using force or intimidation; (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the woman is under 12 years of age or is demented. People of the Philippines v. Sandy Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017. There is no complex crime of forcible abduction with rape if the primary objective of the accused is to commit rape. Although the elements of forcible abduction obtained, the appellant should be convicted only of rape. His forcible abduction of AAA was absorbed by the rape considering that his real objective in abducting her was to commit the rape. Where the main objective of the culprit for the abduction of the victim of rape was to have carnal knowledge of her, he could be convicted only of rape. People of the Philippines v. Sandy Domingo, G.R. No. 225743, June 7, 2017. RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL INTERCOURSE AND RAPE THROUGH SEXUAL ASSAULT Rape by sexual assault is not subsumed in rape through sexual intercourse. An accused charged in the Information with rape by sexual intercourse cannot be found guilty of rape by sexual assault, even though the latter crime was proven during trial. This is due to the substantial distinctions between these two modes of rape. People of the Philippines v. Noel Go Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017 The language of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 266-A of the RPC, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, provides the elements that substantially differentiate the two forms of rape, i.e., rape by sexual intercourse and rape by sexual assault. It is through legislative process that the dichotomy between these two modes of rape was created. To broaden the scope of rape by sexual assault, by eliminating its legal distinction from rape through sexual intercourse, calls for judicial legislation which We cannot traverse without violating the principle of separation of powers. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers within the constitutional sphere of applying the law as enacted by the Legislature. In fine, given the material distinctions between the two modes of rape introduced in R.A. No. 8353, the variance doctrine cannot be applied to convict an accused of rape by sexual assault if the crime charged is rape through sexual intercourse, since the former offense cannot be considered subsumed in the latter. People of the Philippines v. Noel Go Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017 19 For a charge of rape through sexual intercourse to prosper, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) he accomplished such act through force, threat, or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, by means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority, or when she was under 12 years of age or was demented. Sexual intercourse with a girl below 12 years of age is statutory rape. As to the charge of rape by sexual assault, the same contemplates either of the following situations: (1) a male offender inserts his penis into the mouth or anal orifice of another person, whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant circumstances in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A; or (2) a male or female offender inserts any instrument or object into the genital or anal orifice of another person, whether a man or a woman, under any of the attendant circumstances in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A. In this case, the Court agrees with the findings of the RTC and the Court of Appeals that Dizon committed the crime of rape by sexual assault against AAA by inserting his finger into her anus. We likewise sustain the findings of the lower courts that Dizon committed the crime of rape through sexual intercourse against AAA when he had carnal knowledge of her. People of the Philippines v. Rolly Dizon, G.R. No. 217982, July 10, 2017 The CA's verdict is in full accord with the evidence on record. It is beyond cavil that appellant had carnal knowledge of "AAA" on three separate occasions and the same were committed through force, threat, or intimidation. Appellant also used his moral ascendancy to cow "AAA" to submit to his bestial desires. It is also undisputed that it was properly alleged in the three Informations and proved during trial that appellant is the father of "AAA," a 13-year-old minor at the time of the rape incidents. Undoubtedly, appellant committed the crime of qualified rape (three counts). Both the trial court and the CA therefore properly sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count of qualified rape but without eligibility of parole. However, the amount of damages awarded must be modified. In line with prevailing jurisprudence, the awards of civil indemnity, moral damages, and exemplary damages are increased to Pl 00,000.00 each. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from date of finality of this Decision until full payment. People of the Philippines v. Melchor Panes, G.R. No. 215730, September 11, 2017 ROBBERY WITH RAPE The rule in this jurisdiction is that whenever a rape is committed as a consequence, or on the occasion of a robbery, all those who took part therein are liable as principals of the crime of robbery with rape, although not all of them took part in the rape. People of the Philippines v. Marlon Belmonte et al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017 20 Once conspiracy is established between several accused in the commission of the crime of robbery, as in the present case, they would all be equally culpable for the rape committed by anyone of them on the occasion of the robbery, unless anyone of them proves that he endeavored to prevent the others from committing rape. People of the Philippines v. Marlon Belmonte et al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017 The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Section 9 of Republic Act No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying crime. People of the Philippines v. Marlon Belmonte et al., G.R. No. 220889, July 5, 2017 SELF DEFENSE There are three essential elements that must be established by an accused claiming self-defense: (1) the victim committed unlawful aggression amounting to actual and imminent threat to the life of the accused; (2) there was reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel the attack; and (3) there was lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the accused claiming selfdefense. In Criminal Case No. 1631, the victim, Nonilon, was stabbed by appellant five times which caused Nonilon's death. When appellant started attacking Nonilon, the latter was already in a kneeling position with his hands raised, indicating a position of surrender. However, appellant still hacked Nonilon, hitting him on his left forearm. Thereafter, appellant stabbed Nonilon four more times on the right and left chest. Clearly, even if there might be unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon at the start, it already ceased when Nonilon ran away and when appellant caught up with him. Nonilon, who was already kneeling with his hands raised, was quite helpless when appellant started stabbing him. At that moment, there was no unlawful aggression on the part of Nonilon which amounts to actual or imminent threat to the life of appellant. Thus, the first element of unlawful aggression is already lacking in this case. Appellant's claim that Nonilon tried to stab him first with a knife was belied by the testimony of another defense witness who stated that Nonilon was armed only with a piece of wood which he picked up while running after appellant. Even appellant's wife testified that she only saw Nonilon throwing stones at her husband. Appellant's wife never testified that Nonilon was armed with a knife. People of the Philippines v. Augusto Gallanosa, Jr. G.R. No. 219885, July 17, 2017. However, based on the records and the evidence adduced by both parties, it is indisputable that Sabida failed to show that Mawac exhibited unlawful aggression against him. Being the party initiating the attack and armed with a deadly weapon, Sabida cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression. Sabida's self- 21 serving claim of self-defense coupled with the fact that he did not sustain any injury from his supposed attacker fails to support any claim of unlawful aggression. The trial court aptly noted that there was no clear and credible evidence that Mawac was the one who instigated the fight and that Sabida was merely fending off an attack. People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Sabida, G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017. SELF-DEFENSE V. RETALIATION Considering that self-defense is an affirmative allegation and totally exonerates the accused from any criminal liability, it is well settled that when it is invoked, the burden of evidence shifts to the accused to prove it by credible, clear and convincing evidence. The accused claiming self-defense must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness ofthe prosecution. Self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated when uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence or when it is extremely doubtful by itself. The essential elements of self-defense are the following: (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel such aggression, and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. To invoke selfdefense successfully, there must have been an unlawful and unprovoked attack that endangered the life of the accused, who was then forced to inflict severe wounds upon the assailant by employing reasonable means to resist the attack. While all three elements must concur, self-defense relies first and foremost on proof of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. If no unlawful aggression is proved, no selfdefense may be successfully pleaded. Unlawful aggression is a conditio sine qua non for upholding the justifying circumstance of self-defense; if there is nothing to prevent or repel, the other two requisites of self-defense will have no basis. What actually transpired in the present case is not an act of selfdefense but an act of retaliation on the part of Tica. These two concepts are not the same. In retaliation, the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased when the accused attacked him, while in self-defense the aggression still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused. "When an unlawful aggression that has begun no longer exists, the one who resorts to self-defense has no right to kill or even wournd the former aggressor. To be sure, when the present victim no longer persisted in his purpose or action to the extent that the object of his attack was no longer in peril, there was no more unlawful aggression that would warrant legal selfdefense on the part of the offender." Undoubtedly, Tica went beyond the call of self-preservation when he proceeded to inflict excessive, atrocious and fatal injuries to Intia, even when the allegedly unlawful aggression had already ceased the night before. Even assuming that the unlawful aggression emanated from Intia, the means employed by Tica was not reasonably commensurate to the nature and extent of the alleged attack that he sought to prevent. The means employed by the person invoking self-defense contemplates a rational equivalence between the means of attack and the defense. It must be commensurate 22 to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression. In this case, Intia was unarmed when he allegedly attacked Tica. Considering that Tica is taller, had a bigger body built, and younger than Intia, he could have simply engaged him in a fistfight. Instead, using his own knife, Tica chose to fatally stab Intia about six times, which caused the victim's eventual death. We have held in the past that the nature and number of wounds are constantly and unremittingly considered important indicia which disprove a plea of self-defense. People of the Philippines v. Jonathan Tica, G.R. No. 222561, August 30, 2017 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE HIERARCHY OF COURTS Trifling with the rule on hierarchy of courts is looked upon with disfavor by this Court. It will not entertain direct resort to it when relief can be obtained in the lower courts. The Court has repeatedly emphasized that the rule on hierarchy of courts is an important component of the orderly administration of justice and not imposed merely for whimsical and arbitrary reasons. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Petitioner's allegation that her case has sparked national and international interest is obviously not covered by the exceptions to the rules on hierarchy of courts. The notoriety of a case, without more, is not and will not be a reason for this Court's decisions. Neither will this Court be swayed to relax its rules on the bare fact that the petitioner belongs to the minority party in the present administration. A primary hallmark of an independent judiciary is its political neutrality. This Court is thus loath to perceive and consider the issues before it through the warped prisms of political partisanships. That the petitioner is a senator of the republic does not also merit a special treatment of her case. The right to equal treatment before the law accorded to every Filipino also forbids the elevation of petitioner's cause on account of her position and status in the government. Further, contrary to her position, the matter presented before the Court is not of first impression. Petitioner is not the first public official accused of violating RA 9165 nor is she the first defendant to question the finding of probable cause for her arrest. In fact, stripped of all political complexions, the controversy involves run-of-the mill matters that could have been resolved with ease by the lower court had it been given a chance to do so in the first place. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. In like manner, petitioner's argument that the rule on the hierarchy of court should be disregarded as her case involves pure questions of law does not obtain. One 23 of the grounds upon which petitioner anchors her case is that the respondent judge erred and committed grave abuse of discretion in finding probable cause to issue her arrest. By itself, this ground removes the case from the ambit of cases involving pure questions of law. It is established that the issue of whether or not probable cause exists for the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused is a question of fact, determinable as it is from a review of the allegations in the Information, the Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor, including other documents and/or evidence appended to the Information. This matter, therefore, should have first been brought before the appellate court, which is in the better position to review and determine factual matters. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Yet, petitioner harps on the supposed judicial efficiency and economy of abandoning the rule on the hierarchy of courts in the present case. Indeed, the Court has considered the practical aspects of the administration of justice in deciding to apply the exceptions rather than the rule. However, it is all the more for these practical considerations that the Court must insist on the application of the rule and not the exceptions in this case. As petitioner herself alleges, with the President having declared the fight against illegal drugs and corruption as central to his platform of government, there will be a spike of cases brought before the courts involving drugs and public officers. As it now stands, there are 232,557 criminal cases involving drugs, and around 260,796 criminal cases involving other offenses pending before the RTCs. This Court cannot thus allow a precedent allowing public officers assailing the finding of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants to be brought directly to this Court, bypassing the appellate court, without any compelling reason. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. ADMISSION AGAINST INTEREST Petitioner De Lima asks for a writ of certiorari annulling the Order dated February 23, 2017 finding probable cause, the warrant of arrest and the Order dated February 24, 2017 committing petitioner to the custody of the PNP Custodial Center. Clearly petitioner seeks the recall of said orders to effectuate her release from detention and restore her liberty. She did not ask for the dismissal of the subject criminal case. More importantly, her request for the issuance of a writ of prohibition under paragraph (b) of the prayer "until and unless the Motion to Quash is resolved with finality," is an unmistakable admission that the RTC has yet to rule on her Motion to Quash and the existence of the RTC's authority to rule on the said motion. This admission against interest binds the petitioner; an admission against interest being the best evidence that affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute. It is based on the presumption that "no man would declare anything against himself unless such declaration is true." It can be presumed then that the declaration corresponds with the 24 truth, and it is her fault if it does not. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. No Party should Pre-empt the Action of a Trial Court Petitioner prayed for a TRO and writ of preliminary injunction and a status quo ante order which easily reveal her real motive in filing the instant petition-to restore to "petitioner her liberty and freedom." Nowhere in the prayer did petitioner explicitly ask for the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 17-165. What is clear is she merely asked the respondent judge to rule on her Motion to Quash before issuing the warrant of arrest. In view of the foregoing, there is no other course of action to take than to dismiss the petition on the ground of prematurity and allow respondent Judge to rule on the Motion to Quash according to the desire of petitioner. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Indeed, the prematurity of the present petition cannot be over-emphasized considering that petitioner is actually asking the Court to rule on some of the grounds subject of her Motion to Quash. The Court, if it rules positively in favor of petitioner regarding the grounds of the Motion to Quash, will be preempting the respondent Judge from doing her duty to resolve the said motion and even prejudge the case. This is clearly outside of the ambit of orderly and expeditious rules of procedure. This, without a doubt, causes an inevitable delay in the proceedings in the trial court, as the latter abstains from resolving the incidents until this Court rules with finality on the instant petition. Without such order, the present petition cannot satisfy the requirements set before this Court can exercise its review powers. Section 5 (2)(C) of Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution explicitly requires the existence of "final judgments and orders of lower courts" before the Court can exercise its power to "review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari" in "all cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue". Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION IN A VACCUM In the palpable absence of a ruling on the Motion to Quash -- which puts the jurisdiction of the lower court in issue -- there is no controversy for this Court to resolve; there is simply no final judgment or order of the lower court to review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm. As per the block letter provision of the Constitution, this Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction in a vacuum nor issue a definitive ruling on mere suppositions. Succinctly, the present petition is immediately dismissible for this Court lacks jurisdiction to review a non-existent court action. It can only act to protect a party from a real and actual ruling by a lower tribunal. Surely, it is not for this Court to negate "uncertain contingent future event that may not occur as anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all," as the lower court's feared denial of the subject Motion 25 to Quash. The established rule is that courts of justice will take cognizance only of controversies "wherein actual and not merely hypothetical issues are involved." The reason underlying the rule is "to prevent the courts through avoidance of premature adjudication from entangling themselves in abstract disagreements, and for us to be satisfied that the case does not present a hypothetical injury or a claim contingent upon some event that has not and indeed may never transpire." Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Exercise of Original Jurisdiction requires an Assailed Ruling or Judgment Even granting argu,endo that what is invoked is the original jurisdiction of this Court under Section 5 (1) of Article VIII, the petition nonetheless falls short of the Constitutional requirements and ofRule 65 ofthe Rules of Court. In the absence of a final judgment, order, or ruling on the Motion to Quash challenging the jurisdiction of the lower court, there is no occasion for this Court to issue the extraordinary writ of certiorari. Without a judgment or ruling, there is nothing for this Court to declare as having been issued without jurisdiction or in grave abuse of discretion. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Requirements for Review on Certiorari Furthermore, it is a basic requirement under Rule 65 that there be "[no] other plain, speedy and adequate remedy found in law." Thus, the failure to exhaust all other remedies, as will be later discussed, before a premature resort to this Court is fatal to the petitioner's cause of action. Petitioner even failed to move for the reconsideration of the February 23 and 24, 2017 Orders she is currently assailing in this Petition. As this Court held in Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, "[a] motion for reconsideration allows the public respondent an opportunity to correct its factual and legal errors xx x [it] is mandatory before the filing of a petition for certiorari." The reasons proffered by petitioner fail to justify her present premature recourse. Various policies and rules have been issued to curb the tendencies of litigants to disregard, nay violate, the rule enunciated in Section 5 of Article VIII of the Constitution to allow the Court to devote its time and attention to matters within its jurisdiction and prevent the overcrowding of its docket. There is no reason to consider the proceedings at bar as an exception. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. CRIMINAL INFORMATION The Court, thus, takes this occasion to once again remind public prosecutors of their crucial role in drafting criminal complaints or Information. They have to be more judicious and circumspect in preparing the Information since a mistake or defect 26 therein may not render full justice to the State, the offended party and even the offender. People of the Philippines v. Noel Go Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017 Specific reference of the exact date or time of the commission of rape is not an element of the said crime. What is essential to sustain conviction is proof of carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the circumstances provided by law. "Precision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission. People of the Philippines v. Romeo De Guzman, G.R. No. 228248, August 9, 2017. Time and again, the Court has held that the date or time of the commission of rape is not a material ingredient of the crime and need not be stated with absolute accuracy; where the time of commission is not an essential element of the crime charged, conviction may be had on proof of the commission of the crime, even if it appears that the crime was not committed at the precise time alleged. It is well to stress that variance in minor details has the net effect of bolstering instead of diminishing the witness' credibility because they discount the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. Instead, what remains paramount is the witness' consistency in relating the principal elements of the crime and the positive and categorical identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the same. People of the Philippines v. Federico Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017 THOUGHT PROCESSES INVOLVED IN CRAFTING A CRIMINAL INFORMATION Notably, the designation, the prefatory statements and the accusatory portions of the Information repeatedly provide that the petitioner is charged with "Violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, Republic Act No. 9165." From the very designation of the crime in the Information itself, it should be plain that the crime with which the petitioner is charged is a violation of RA 9165. As this Court clarified in Quimvel v. People, the designation of the offense in the Information is a critical element required under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court in apprising the accused of the offense being charged. Further, a reading of the provisions of RA 9165 under which the petitioner is prosecuted would convey that De Lima is being charged as a conspirator in the crime of Illegal Drug Trading. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. 27 While it may be argued that some facts may be taken as constitutive of some elements of Direct Bribery under the Revised Penal Code (RPC), these facts taken together with the other allegations in the Information portray a much bigger picture, Illegal Drug Trading. The latter crime, described by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) as "a global illicit trade involving the cultivation, manufacture, distribution and sale of substances," necessarily involves various component crimes, not the least of which is the bribery and corruption of government officials. An example would be reports of recent vintage regarding billions of pesos' worth of illegal drugs allowed to enter Philippine ports without the scrutiny of Customs officials. Any money and bribery that may have changed hands to allow the importation of the confiscated drugs are certainly but trivial contributions in the furtherance of the transnational illegal drug trading - the offense for which the persons involve should be penalized. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Read as a whole, and not picked apart with each word or phrase construed separately, the Information against De Lima goes beyond an indictment for Direct Bribery under Article 210 of the RPC. As Justice Martires articulately explained, the averments on solicitation of money in the Information, which may be taken as constitutive of bribery, form "part of the description on how illegal drug trading took place at the NBP." The averments on how petitioner asked for and received money from the NBP inmates simply complete the links of conspiracy between her, Ragos, Dayan and the NBP inmates in willfully and unlawfully trading dangerous drugs through the use of mobile phones and other electronic devices under Section 5, in relation to Section 3(jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28, of RA 9165. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. On this score, that it has not been alleged that petitioner actually participated in the actual trafficking of dangerous drugs and had simply allowed the NBP inmates to do so is non sequitur given that the allegation of conspiracy makes her liable for the acts of her co-conspirators. As this Court elucidated, it is not indispensable for a co-conspirator to take a direct part in every act of the crime. A conspirator need not even know of all the parts which the others have to perform, as conspiracy is the common design to commit a felony; it is not participation in all the details of the execution of the crime. As long as the accused, in one way or another, helped and cooperated in the consummation of a felony, she is liable as a co-principal. 83 As the Information provides, De Lima's participation and cooperation was instrumental in the trading of dangerous drugs by the NBP inmates. The minute details of this participation and cooperation are matters of evidence that need not be specified in the Information but presented and threshed out during trial. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. 28 With the complexity of the operations involved in Illegal Trading of drugs, as recognized and defined in RA 9165, it will be quite myopic and restrictive to require the elements of Illegal Sale-a mere component act-in the prosecution for Illegal Trading. More so, that which qualifies the crime of Illegal Trafficking to Illegal Trading may make it impossible to provide the details of the elements of Illegal Sale. By "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, email, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms," the Illegal Trading can be remotely perpetrated away from where the drugs are actually being sold; away from the subject of the illegal sale. With the proliferation of digital technology coupled with ride sharing and delivery services, Illegal Trading under RA 9165 can be committed without getting one's hand on the substances or knowing and meeting the seller or buyer. To require the elements of Illegal Sale (the identities of the buyer, seller, the object and consideration, in Illegal Trade) would be impractical. The same may be said of the second mode for committing Illegal Trading, or trading by "acting as a broker" in transactions involved in Illegal Trafficking. In this instance, the accused may neither have physical possession of the drugs nor meet the buyer and seller and yet violate RA 9165. As pointed out by Justice Perlas-Bernabe, as early as 1916, jurisprudence has defined a broker as one who is simply a middleman, negotiating contracts relative to property with which he has no custody. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. In some cases, this Court even acknowledged persons as brokers even "where they actually took no part in the negotiations, never saw the customer." For the Court, the primary occupation of a broker is simply bringing "the buyer and the seller together, even if no sale is eventually made." Hence, in indictments for Illegal Trading, it is illogical to require the elements of Illegal Sale of drugs, such as the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object and consideration. For the prosecution of Illegal Trading of drugs to prosper, proof that the accused "act[ed] as a broker" or brought together the buyer and seller of illegal drugs "using electronic devices such as, but not limited to, text messages, e-mail, mobile or landlines, two-way radios, internet, instant messengers and chat rooms" is sufficient. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. The DOJ's designation of the charge as one for Illegal Drug Trading thus holds sway. After all, the prosecution is vested with a wide range of discretion-including the discretion of whether, what, and whom to charge. The exercise of this discretion depends on a smorgasboard of factors, which are best appreciated by the prosecutors. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Granting without conceding that the information contains averments which constitute the elements of Direct Bribery or that more than one offence is charged or as ill this case, possibly bribery and violation of RA 9165, still the prosecution has the 29 authority to amend the information at any time before arraignment. Since petitioner has not yet been arraigned, then the information subject of Criminal Case No. 17-165 can still be amended pursuant to Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS EXCLUSIVE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OVER DRUGS CASES The pertinent special law governing drug-related cases is RA 9165, which updated the rules provided in RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. A plain reading of RA 9165, as of RA 6425, will reveal that jurisdiction over drug-related cases is exclusively vested with the Regional Trial Court and no other. The exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165 is not transferred to the Sandiganbayan whenever the accused occupies a position classified as Grade 27 or higher, regardless of whether the violation is alleged as committed in relation to office. The power of the Sandiganbayan to sit in judgment of high-ranking government officials is not omnipotent. The Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is circumscribed by law and its limits are currently defined and prescribed by RA 10660,97 which amended Presidential Decree No. (PD) 1606. It should occasion no surprise, therefore, that the Sandiganbayan is without jurisdiction to hear drugrelated cases. Even Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660, touted by the petitioner and the dissents as a catchall provision, does not operate to strip the RTCs of its exclusive original jurisdiction over violations of RA 9165. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. Certainly, jurisdiction over offenses and felonies committed by public officers is not determined solely by the pay scale or by the fact that they were committed "in relation to their office." In determining the forum vested with the jurisdiction to try and decide criminal actions, the laws governing the subject matter of the criminal prosecution must likewise be considered. In this case, RA 9165 specifies the RTC as the court with the jurisdiction to "exclusively try and hear cases involving violations of [RA 9165)." This is an exception, couched in the special law on dangerous drugs, to the general rule under Section 4(b) of PD 1606, as amended by RA 10660. It is a canon of statutory construction that a special law prevails over a general law and the latter is to be considered as an exception to the general. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. The exceptional rule provided under Section 90, RA 9165 relegating original exclusive jurisdiction to RTCs specially designated by the Supreme Court logically follows given the technical aspect of drug-related cases. With the proliferation of cases involving violation of RA 9165, it is easy to dismiss them as common and untechnical. However, narcotic substances possess unique characteristics that render them not readily identifiable. In fact, they must first be subjected to scientific analysis by 30 forensic chemists to determine their composition and nature. Thus, judges presiding over designated drugs courts are specially trained by the Philippine Judicial Academy (PhilJa) and given scientific instructions to equip them with the proper tools to appreciate pharmacological evidence and give analytical insight upon this esoteric subject. After all, the primary consideration of RA 9165 is the fact that the substances involved are, in fact, dangerous drugs, their plant sources, or their controlled precursors and essential chemicals. Without a doubt, not one of the Sandiganbayan justices were provided with knowledge and technical expertise on matters relating to prohibited substances. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE FOR THE ISSUANCE OF AN ARREST WARRANT Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of the guilt of the accused. 129 She is given wide latitude of discretion in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest. A finding of probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Again, per the February 23, 2017 Order, respondent judge evaluated all the evidence presented during the preliminary investigation and on the basis thereof found probable cause to issue the warrant of arrest against the petitioner. This is not surprising given that the only evidence available on record are those provided by the complainants and the petitioner, in fact, did not present any counter-affidavit or evidence to controvert this. Thus, there is nothing to disprove the following preliminary findings of the DOJ prosecutors relative to the allegations in the Information filed in Criminal Case No. 17-165. Senator Leila M. De Lima v. Hon. Juanita Guerrero et al., G.R. No. 229781, October 10, 2017. EXTRAJUDICIAL CONFESSION Dela Cruz's extrajudicial confession without counsel at the police station without a valid waiver of the right to counsel - that is, in writing and in the presence of counsel - is inadmissible in evidence. It is undisputed that Dela Cruz was neither assisted by a lawyer nor was his confession reduced into writing. Further, when the police officers informed Dela Cruz of his right to a lawyer, the latter did not say anything. Even so, such silence did not constitute a valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to have a competent and independent counsel. Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution states that "[t]hese rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel." Dela Cruz was merely told of his Constitutional rights, but he 31 was never asked whether he understood what he was told or whether he wanted to exercise or avail himself of such rights. This kind of perfunctory giving of the socalled Miranda rights is what this Court has previously frowned upon as ineffective and inadequate compliance with the mandates of the Constitution. Any confession obtained under these circumstances is flawed and cannot be used as evidence not only against the declarant but also against his co-accused. People of the Philippines v. Romaldo Lumayag et al, G.R. No. 181474, July 26, 2017 PROCEDURAL DELAY Delay in the prosecution of an offense is not an indicium of a fabricated charge. People of the Philippines v. Federico Gerola, G.R. No. 217973, July 19, 2017 MIRANDA DOCTRINE The Miranda doctrine requires that: (a) any person under custodial investigation has the right to remain silent; (b) anything he says can and will be used against him in a court of law; (c) he has the right to talk to an attorney before being questioned and to have his counsel present when being questioned; and (d) if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided before any questioning if he so desires. The said rights are guaranteed to preclude the slightest use of coercion by the State as would lead the accused to admit something false, not to prevent him from freely and voluntarily telling the truth. People of the Philippines v. Robelyn Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7438 reinforced the constitutional mandate and expanded the definition of custodial investigation. This means that even those who voluntarily surrendered before a police officer must be apprised of their Miranda rights. People of the Philippines v. Robelyn Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 The subsequent confession of Cabanada at the CIU office can be considered as having been done in a custodial setting because (1) after admitting the crime, Cabanada was brought to the police station for further investigation; (2) the alleged confession happened in the office of the chief; (3) P02 Cotoner was present during Cabanada's apology and admission to Catherine. The compelling pressures of custodial setting were present when the accused was brought to the police station along with Catherine. People of the Philippines v. Robelyn Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 Any statement obtained in violation of the constitutional provision, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence. Even if the confession contains a grain of truth, if it was made without the assistance 32 of counsel, it becomes inadmissible in evidence, regardless of the absence of coercion or even if it had been voluntarily given. Cabanada's confession without counsel at the police station, which led to the recovery of the other items at her house, is inadmissible. People of the Philippines v. Robelyn Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION The "investigation" in Section 12, paragraph 1 of the Bill of Rights pertains to "custodial investigation." Custodial investigation commences when a person is taken into custody and is singled out as a suspect in the commission of a crime under investigation and the police officers begin to ask questions on the suspect's participation therein and which tend to elicit an admission. People of the Philippines v. Robelyn Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017. The circumstances surrounding Cabanada's appearance before the police station falls within the definition of custodial investigation. Despite the claim that she was not considered as a suspect at that time, the fact remains that she confessed to having committed the crime and was able to produce the money from her room. The investigation, therefore, ceased to be a general inquiry even if they contemplated that she was covering for someone. People of the Philippines v. Robelyn Cabanada, G.R. No. 221424, July 19, 2017 APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and, thus, it is the duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law." People of the Philippines v. John Paul Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017 DEATH OF ACCUSED PENDING APPEAL OF CONVICTION Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. Accused's civil liability based on sources other than the subject delict survives, and the victim 33 may file a separate civil action against the estate of accused-appellant, as may be warranted by law and procedural rules. People of the Philippines v. Agapito Dimaala, G.R. No. 225054, July 17, 2017. EVIDENCE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE At the onset of any criminal proceeding, a constitutional presumption exists for the accused arising from the fact that he is charged with the commission of a crime, i.e., the accused is presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt. This presumption exists without requiring the accused to do anything to trigger it other than be the subject of a criminal charge. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016 BURDEN OF PROOF The State bears the burden of establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Any doubt regarding the evidence of guilt is resolved in favor of the accused. People of the Philippines v. Parok Lumudag, G.R. No. 201478, August 23, 2017 BURDEN OF PROOF IN DRUGS CASES Lumudag has challenged the police officers' failure to comply with the requirements outlined in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 only for the first time on appeal. The delay of his challenge hardly matters. It was really not up to the Defense to raise such issue at the start because the disclosure of the necessary justification for any lapse or gap in following the requirements was always the sole responsibility of the State by virtue of the obligation of the members of the buy-bust team themselves to explain why the lapses or gaps had occurred. To state otherwise is to contravene the constitutional guarantee of due process of law, particularly the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Verily, without the State's justification for the lapses or gaps, the chain of custody so essential in the establishment of the corpus delicti of the offense charged against Lumudag was not shown to be unbroken and preserved. The non-disclosure of the justification by the members of the buy-bust team underscored the uncertainty about the identity and integrity of the shabu admitted as evidence against the accused. The unavoidable consequence of the non-disclosure of the justification was the nonestablishment of the chain of custody, which, in turn, 34 raised serious doubt on whether or not the shabu presented as evidence was the shabu supposedly sold by Lumudag, or whether or not shabu had really been sold by him. We should always demand that in every prosecution of the sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride prohibited under Republic Act No. 9165, the State must alone discharge the heavy burden of proving the elements of the offense, and should the State not discharge its burden, we should then unhesitatingly hold and pronounce that the guilt of the accused had not been proven beyond reasonable doubt. Without the credible proof of the unbroken and unassailable chain of custody, the evidence of the corpus delicti was not adduced. This could mean either that the dangerous drug truly the subject of the prosecution had been lost or gone missing, or that the substantial gaps in the chain of custody of the prohibited substance worked against the authenticity of the dangerous substance presented as evidence in court. Without question, any substantial gap rendered the case for the State less than complete in terms of proving the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt Thus, Lumudag deserves acquittal from the crime charged on the ground of reasonable doubt of his guilt. People of the Philippines v. Parok Lumudag, G.R. No. 201478, August 23, 2017 PROPER HANDLING OF EVIDENCE IN DRUGS CASES Decoy Solicitation A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buy-bust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operation. The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminal's 'course of conduct. A "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation. It is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilities for its commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and apparently assisting its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the office is one habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Here, the solicitation by SP02 Agbayani and the informant of drugs from Lingbanan ana Alacdis, that was delivered by accused-appellant, is mere evidence of a course of conduct. The police received an intelligence report that accused-appellant has been habitually dealing in illegal drugs. They duly acted on it by utilizing an informant to effect a drug transaction with the accused-appellant. There was no showing that the infonnant induced the accused-appellant to sell illegal drugs to him. People of the Philippines v. Wilton Alacdis, G.R. No. 220022, June 19, 2017. In this case, it was shown that there was a prior surveillance on appellant's illegal activities and it was confirmed that indeed appellant was selling illegal drugs, 35 hence, a buy-bust operation was planned. The CI introduced P02 Ricote to appellant as a buyer of marijuana. Appellant negotiated with P02 Ricote as to the price of the marijuana to which the latter agreed and paid the same, and he was arrested. No doubt, what transpired was a typical buy-bust operation which is a form of entrapment. A police officer's act of soliciting drugs from the accused during a buybust operation, or what is known as a "decoy solicitation," is not prohibited by law and does not render invalid the buy-bust operations. The sale of contraband is a kind of offense habitually committed, and the solicitation simply furnishes evidence of the criminal's course of conduct. People of the Philippines v. Armando Mendoza, G.R. No. 220759, July 24, 2017. Observance of the Chain of Custody The State, not the accused, has the heavy burden of justifying at the trial the lapses or gaps in the chain of custody. Without the justification, the chain of custody is not shown to be unbroken; hence, the integrity of the evidence of the corpus delicti was not preserved. The acquittal of the accused should follow. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Geronimo, G.R. No.180447, August 23, 2017. Presenting in court the corpus delicti is not rote function, but a tedious undertaking. Much had already been said about the unique characteristic of narcotic substances - that they are not readily identifiable and prone to tampering, alteration, or substitution - which justifies the Court's imposition of a more exacting standard before they could be accepted as evidence, if only to render it improbable that the integrity or identity of the original item had been compromised. This is where the observance of the chain of custody comes in. People of the Philippines v. Jocelyn Carlit, G.R. No. 227309, August 16, 2017. Processing and Treatment of Seized Articles Rules require the marking of the seized drug immediately upon seizure. Such marking is the starting point in the custodial chain, because succeeding handlers of the seized drug or related items will use the marking as their reference. It further serves to segregate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar and related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thereby obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence. It is also crucial in ensuring the integrity of the chain of custody. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Geronimo, G.R. No.180447, August 23, 2017 A review of the records indicates that the procedure laid down by Republic Act No. 9165 and its IRR was not followed by the agents of the State. Several substantial lapses on the part of the buy-bust team are readily apparent. To start with, no 36 photograph of the seized shabu was taken either at the place of the entrapment and arrest, or even later on after the buy-bust team had brought the accused-appellant to their office. The photograph would have visually preserved the seized shabu for proving the corpus delicti. Secondly, although POI Janet Sabo, the poseur-buyer, attested that she had placed her initials "JAS" on the confiscated shabu at the place of the entrapment right after the accused-appellant had been apprised of his constitutional rights by P03 Hunilassan Salisa, none of the members of the buy-bust team saw the need to photograph the seized shabu and the confiscated buy-bust bills then and even later on. And, thirdly, no elected official, or member of the media, or representative of the Department of Justice was present. The last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR provides a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of noncompliance irreversibly prejudices the State's evidence. It is significant to note, however, that the application of the saving mechanism to any particular situation is expressly conditioned upon the State rendering a fitting or suitable explanation of the lapse or gap in the compliance with the procedures. The explanation should at least disclose to the trial court the reason or reasons for the lapse or gap in compliance with the procedure considering that every step in the procedure is an essential link in the chain of custody. Here, the Prosecution tendered no explanation of why none of the members of the buy-bust team had seen to the taking of any photograph of the seized shabu immediately after the arrest, or even afterwards. Likewise, there was no explanation given as to why they did not ensure the presence of an elected official, or member of the media, or representative of the Department of Justice during the entrapment and confiscation of the evidence. We should specially note at this juncture that the requirements were not unknown to the members of the buy-bust team, whom we must presume to have been well-instructed on the law demanding the preservation of the links in the chain of custody. They should then have dutifully seen to the compliance with the requirements, and if their compliance was not full, they should at least have the readiness to explain the step or steps omitted from such compliance. Surely, the saving mechanism under the last paragraph of Section 21(a) of the IRR would not apply if there was no credible showing of any effort undertaken by the members of the buy-bust team to keep the shabu intact while in transit from the moment of seizure to the police station, and beyond, until the disposal of the shabu after the trial. People of the Philippines v. Fernando Geronimo, G.R. No.180447, August 23, 2017. To our mind, the procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized drugs, as well as the unexplained discrepancy in the marking, collectively raise doubts on whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that were taken from Cayas when she was arrested. These constitute major lapses that, standing unexplained, are fatal to the prosecution’s case. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016 37 The conditions set by Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 were not met in the present case as the prosecution, in the first place, did not even recognize the procedural lapses the police committed in handling the confiscated items. Had the prosecution done so, it would not have glossed over the deficiencies and would have, at the very least, submitted an explanation and proof showing that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had been preserved. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016 All told, the identity and the evidentiary value of the three (3) plastic sachets containing shabu confiscated from Cayas were not substantially proven because her arresting officers failed to strictly comply with the procedure laid down in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, and the prosecution failed to prove the crucial links in the chain of custody rule. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016 Presumption of Regularity v. Lapses and Gaps in the Chain of Custody The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties in favor of the police officers will not save the prosecution's case, given the foregoing lapses and gaps in the chain of custody. The presumption stands only when no reason exists in the records by which to doubt the regularity of the performance of official duty. And even in that instance, the presumption. of regularity will never be stronger than the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Otherwise, a mere rule of evidence will defeat the constitutionally enshrined right of an accused. People of the Philippines v. Rommel Diputado, G.R. No. 213922, July 5, 2017 Moreover, the prosecution and the lower courts cannot simply rely on the presumption that the arresting officers were in the regular performance of their duties in the light of Cayas’ right to be presumed innocent. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions cannot preponderate over the presumption of innocence that prevails if not overthrown by proof beyond reasonable doubt.23 It must be remembered that the presumption of regularity is a mere statutory and rebuttable presumption created under Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Rules of Court; to recognize it as sufficient to overturn the constitutional presumption of innocence would be an unconstitutional act. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016 Without the presumption of regularity, testimonies of the arresting officers must stand on their own merits and must sufficiently establish proof beyond reasonable doubt that the corpus delicti of the offenses of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs exists. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016. 38 The defense evidence must likewise be so regarded without being hobbled by the presumption of regularity. From the perspective of the defense, we cannot but note that the evidence for the defense is not strong as Cayas merely claimed that she was framed, and implied that the plastic sachets confiscated from her were planted. In this jurisdiction, the defense of denial and frame-up, like alibi, has been viewed with disfavor for it can be easily concocted and is a common defense ploy in drug cases. These weaknesses, however, do not add any strength nor can they help the prosecution's case because the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own weight. In the first place, if the prosecution cannot establish Cayas' guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the need for her to adduce evidence on her behalf, in fact, never arises. Thus, we go back to the conclusion that Cayas should be acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. People of the Philippines v. Maritess Cayas G.R. No. 206888, July 4, 2016 It is true that Section 21(a) of the IRR provides that the "noncompliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items." Yet, such saving mechanism is conditioned upon a clear showing on the part of the agents of the law not only that the non-compliance with the requirements was upon justifiable grounds, but also that the evidentiary value of the seized items was properly preserved by the apprehending team. As the records bear out, however, the required justification was not given herein by any of the members of the buy-bust team. People of the Philippines v. Parok Lumudag, G.R. No. 201478, August 23, 2017 It is fitting to mention that '[t]he Court strongly supports the campaign of the government against drug addiction and commends the efforts of our law enforcement officers against those who would inflict this malediction upon our people, especially the susceptible youth. But as demanding as this campaign may be, it cannot be more so than the compulsions of the Bill of Rights for the protection of liberty of every individual in the realm, including the basest of criminals. The Constitution covers with the mantle of its protection the innocent and the guilty alike against any manner of high-handedness from the authorities, however praiseworthy their intentions. Those who are supposed to enforce the law are not justified in disregarding the right of the individual in the name of order. Order is too high a price for the loss of liberty. People of the Philippines v. John Paul Ceralde, G.R. No. 228894, August 7, 2017 INSUFFICIENCY AND INACCURACY OF AFFIDAVITS It is oft-repeated that affidavits are usually abbreviated and inaccurate. Oftentimes, an affidavit is incomplete, resulting in its seeming contradiction with the declarant's testimony in court. Generally, the affiant is asked standard questions, coupled with ready suggestions intended to elicit answers, that later tum out not to 39 be wholly descriptive of the series of events as the affiant knows them. Worse, the process of affidavit-taking may sometimes amount to putting words into the affiant's mouth, thus, allowing the whole statement to be taken out of context. Discrepancies between the statements of the affiant in his affidavit and those made by him on the witness stand do not necessarily discredit him since ex parte affidavits are generally incomplete. People of the Philippines v. Zenaida Fabro, G.R. No. 208441, July 17, 2017 ASSESSMENT OF WITNESSES Well-settled is the rule that findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses deserve great weight, as the trial judge is in the best position to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and has the unique opportunity to observe the witness first hand and note his demeanor, conduct and attitude under gruelling examination. People of the Philippines v. Gabby Concepcion and Toto Morales, G.R. No. 212206, July 4, 2016. Generally, the assessment by the trial judge of the credibility of the witnesses is accorded the highest respect on appeal primarily because of his unique opportunity to directly observe the demeanor of the witnesses, thereby enabling him to determine the truthfulness and reliability of their testimonies. This assessment, once affirmed by the CA, is binding and conclusive upon the Court, unless there is a showing that certain facts or circumstances had been overlooked or misinterpreted that, if properly considered, would substantially affect the ruling of the case. People of the Philippines v. Parok Lumudag, G.R. No. 201478, August 23, 2017 Reggie was found to be at the crime scene when the crime of murder took place. The appellate court found Reggie's testimony "clear, straightforward and credible." While Reggie may be a member of Siete Pares a rival group of Otso Makulit, we agree with the appellate court's ratio decidendi that this fact alone does not make Reggie a biased witness. With respect to appellants' allegation that it was impossible for Reggie to have witnessed the whole incident, Reggie categorically stated in his direct examination that he was about two to three meters from the situs criminis. He was also familiar with appellants, they being his former friends. People of the Philippines v. Gabby Concepcion and Toto Morales, G.R. No. 212206, July 4, 2016. Clearly, the trial court did not err in giving credence to the testimony of Pimentel, since he saw the entire event transpire before him, from Sabida's emergence from the road until his attack on the victim, since he was alongside the victim when the incident occurred. Pimentel' s testimony is even bolstered by the fact that he immediately reported what he witnessed and revealed the identity of the assailant to the authorities. More so, Pimentel has not been shown to have been inspired by any 40 ill-motive to incriminate and testify against Sabida. People of the Philippines v. Demetrio Sabida, G.R. No. 208359, June 19, 2017. Inconsistencies in the testimonies of witnesses, when referring only to minor details and collateral matters, do not affect the substance of their declarations or the veracity or the weight of their testimonies. Although there may be inconsistencies on minor details, the same do not impair the credibility of the witnesses where there is consistency in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the accused. It was consistently testified to that the shooting happened so quickly, and that the witnesses' instinct were to seek cover from the bullets. Certainly, at such a sudden violent incident, this Court cannot expect the witnesses to focus on each and every specific detail of the incident. As aforesaid, what is relevant is the consistency in the te.stimony of the prosecution's witnesses to the effect that it was accusedappellant who shot the victim Armando, Jr. People of the Philippines v. Ambrosio Ohayas et al., G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017. The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses pointed out by accused-appellant with respect to the position of Armando, Jr., Lou and Sany, the number of shots fired against the victim, the reaction of accused-appellant's companions after the shooting, how the victim fell, and the exact location of the wounds, do not detract from the overwhelming testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses that accused-appellant came rushing from Sitio Ocampo and suddenly shot the victim. These inconsistencies are minor and inconsequential which even tend to bolster, rather than weaken, the credibility of the witnesses, for they show that such testimonies were not contrived or rehearsed. People of the Philippines v. Ambrosio Ohayas et al., G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017. An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. "He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows." If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court. People of the Philippines v. Edgar Allan Corpuz, G.R. No. 208013, July 3, 2017. TESTIMONIAL EVIDENCE IN RAPE CASES When the victim is of tender age and immature, courts are inclined to give credit to her account of what transpired, considering not only her relative vulnerability but also the shame to which she would be exposed if the matter to which she testified is not true. Youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. People of the Philippines v. Rolly Dizon, G.R. No. 217982, July 10, 2017 41 Testimonies of rape victims who are young and of tender age are credible. The revelation of an innocent child whose chastity was abused deserves full credence. Motives such as resentment, hatred or revenge have never swayed this Court from giving full credence to the testimony of a minor rape victim. Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration, allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the wrong done to her being. People of the Philippines v. Dominador Udtohan, G.R. No. 228887, August 2, 2017 When a rape victim's testimony on the manner she was molested is straightforward and candid, and is corroborated by the medical findings of the examining physician, as in this case, the same is sufficient to support a conviction for rape. In a long line of cases, this Court has given full weight and credit to the testimonies of child victims, considering that their youth and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity. Indeed, leeway should be given to witnesses who are minors, especially when they are relating past incidents of abuse. People of the Philippines v. Noel Go Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, August 8, 2017 We make short shrift of accused-appellant's claim that AAA's failure to immediately report the rape incident is not the normal behavior of a minor girl who had been previously sexually assaulted. The harrowing incident experienced by AAA in the hands of her own father would negate any reasonable standard form of reaction on a rape victim. Time and again, this Court has recognized that different people react differently to a given situation involving a startling occurrence. The workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently - some may shout, others may faint, and still others may be shocked into insensibility even if there may be a few who may openly welcome the intrusion. People of the Philippines v. Alex Amar, G.R. No. 223513, July 5, 2017. Jurisprudence has recognized the fact that no clear-cut behavior can be expected of a person being raped or has been raped. It is a settled rule that failure of the victim to shout or seek help does not negate rape. The delay in reporting the incident to her parents or the proper authorities is insignificant and does not affect the veracity of her charges. The failure of AAA to disclose her defilement without loss of time to persons close to her or to report the matter to the authorities does not perforce warrant the conclusion that she was not sexually molested and that her charges against the accused are all baseless, untrue and fabricated. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapists. They prefer to bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offenders' making good their threats to kill or hurt their victims. Furthermore, their defense of alibi and denial cannot stand against the prosecution's evidence. Alibi is an inherently weak defense because it is easy to fabricate and highly unreliable. To merit approbation, they must adduce clear and convincing evidence that they were in a place other than 42 the situs criminis at the time when the crime was committed, such that it was physically impossible for them to have been at the scene of the crime when it was committed. Accused-appellants failed in this regard. Thus, We find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the trial and appellate courts for the conviction of accusedappellants for the crime of rape against AAA as they were sufficiently supported by the evidence on record. People of the Philippines v. Ernie Carillo et al, G.R. No. 212814, July 12, 2017. Inaccuracies and inconsistencies are expected in ·a rape victim's testimony. Rape is a painful experience which is often times not remembered in detail. It causes deep psychological wounds that scar the victim for life and which her conscious and subconscious mind would opt to forget. Inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness with regard to minor or collateral matters do not diminish the value of the testimony in terms of truthfulness or weight. Thus, a few inconsistent remarks in rape cases will not necessarily impair the testimony of the offended party. People of the Philippines v. Billie Gher Tuballas, G.R. No. 218572, June 19, 2017 The Court has declared repeatedly that "failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not make voluntary the victim's submission to the erpetrator's lust. Besides, physical resistance is not an element of rape." Moreover, a rape victim is oftentimes controlled by fear rather than reason. The use of a knife and bolo and the threat of death posed by appellant constituted sufficient force and intimidation to cow "AAA" into submission. Furthermore, appellant, who is "AAA's" stepfather, undoubtedly exerted a strong moral influence over "AAA," which may even substitute for actual physical violence and intimidation. People of the Philippines v. Nomerto Napoles, G.R. No. 215200, July 26, 2017 DEFENSES OF DENIAL AND ALIBI Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a self-serving assertion that deserves no weight in law, as in this case. Likewise, alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. Here, accused-appellant's alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of his own daughter who had no improper motive to testify falsely. People of the Philippines v. Alex Amar, G.R. No. 223513, July 5, 2017. Basic is the rule that for alibi to prosper, the accused must prove that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed and that it was physically impossible for liim to have been at the scene of the crime. Physical impossibility refers to the distance between the place where the appellant was when the crime transpired and the place where it was committed, as well as the facility of access between the two places. Where there is the least chance for the accused to be present at the crime scene, 43 the defense of alibi must fail. In this case, suffice it to state that the defense failed to establish that it was physically impossible for the accused-appellant to have perpetrated the offense. People of the Philippines v. Ambrosio Ohayas et al., G.R. No. 207516, June 19, 2017. SPECIAL NOTES Cellphone and warrantless search in the Philippines By Subic Lawyer’s Blog http://subiclawyer.blogspot.com/2015/11/cellphone-and-warrantless-searchin.html 4th November 2015 May the police, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested? This issue has been resolved in the seminal US Supreme Court case of Riley vs. California (No. 13-132 [25 June 2014]). Ruling in the negative, the US Supreme Court declares, thus: “We cannot deny that our decision today will have an impact on the ability of law enforcement to combat crime. Cell phones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals. Privacy comes at a cost. Our holding, of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest. Our cases have historically recognized that the warrant requirement is “an important working part of our machinery of government,” not merely “an inconvenience to be somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.” Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U. S. 443, 481 (1971). Recent technological advances similar to those discussed here have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself more efficient. See McNeely, 569 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11–12); id., at ___ (ROBERTS, C. J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (slip op., at 8) (describing jurisdiction where “police officers can email warrant requests to judges’ iPads [and] judges have signed such warrants and emailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes”). Moreover, even though the search incident to arrest exception does not apply to cell phones, other case-specific exceptions may still justify a warrantless search of a particular phone. “One well -recognized exception applies when ‘“the exigencies of 44 the situation” make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.’” Kentuckyv. King, 563 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 6) (quoting Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U. S. 385, 394 (1978)). Such exigencies could include the need to prevent the imminent destruction of evidence in individual cases, to pursue a fleeing suspect, and to assist persons who are seriously injured or are threatened with imminent injury. 563 U. S., at ___. In Chadwick, for example, the Court held that the exception for searches incident to arrest did not justify a search of the trunk at issue, but noted that “if officers have reason to believe that luggage contains some immediately dangerous instrumentality, such as explosives, it would be foolhardy to transport it to the station house without opening the luggage.” 433 U. S., at 15, n. 9. In light of the availability of the exigent circumstances exception, there is no reason to believe that law enforcement officers will not be able to address some of the more extreme hypotheticals that have been suggested: a suspect texting an accomplice who, it is feared, is preparing to detonate a bomb, or a child abductor who may have information about the child’s location on his cell phone. The defendants here recognize—indeed, they stress—that such fact -specific threats may justify a warrantless search of cell phone data. See Reply Brief in No. 13–132, at 8–9; Brief for Respondent in No. 13–212, at 30, 41. The critical point is that, unlike the search incident to arrest exception, the exigent circumstances exception requires a court to examine whether an emergency justified a warrantless search in each particular case. See McNeely, supra, at ___ Our cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment was the founding generation’s response to the reviled “general warrants” and “writs of assistance” of the colonial era, which allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an unrestrained search for evidence of criminal activity. Opposition to such searches was in fact one of the driving forces behind the Revolution itself. In 1761, the patriot James Otis delivered a speech in Boston denouncing the use of writs of assistance. A young John Adams was there, and he would later write that “[e]very man of a crowded audience appeared to me to go away, as I did, ready to take arms against writs of assistance.” 10 Works of John Adams 247–248 (C. Adams ed. 1856). According to Adams, Otis’s speech was “the first scene of the first act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain. Then and there the child Independence was born.” Id., at 248 (quoted in Boyd v. United States, 116 U. S. 616, 625 (1886). Modern cell phones are not just another technological convenience. With all they contain and all they may reveal, they hold for many Americans “the privacies of life,” Boyd, supra, at 630. The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the Founders fought. Our answer to the question of what police 45 must do before searching a cell phone seized incident to an arrest is accordingly simple— get a warrant. We reverse the judgment of the California Court of Appeal in No. 13–132 and remand the case for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. We affirm the judgment of the First Circuit in No. 13–212. It is so ordered.” (Emphasis supplied) It is modestly opined that the United States of America case law, particularly on the right to privacy and against unreasonable searches and seizures, pervades Philippine jurisprudence. In fact, former Chief Justice Reynato Puno discussed the subject matter in his separate opinion in the landmark case ofRepublic of the Philippines v. Sandiganbayan, et. al. (GR No. 104768 [2003]). Quoting US jurisprudence, Chief Justice Puno stated that the “exclusionary rule” had been incorporated in the state system the US because other means of controlling illegal police behavior had failed. He quoted at length significant US rulings, asserting that they had a significant influence in the exclusionary rule in Philippine jurisdiction: “. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf’s constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion, and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct. . . … Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine - an essential part of the right to privacy - be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case. In short, the admission of the new constitutional right by Wolf could not consistently tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule ‘is to deter - to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only available way - by removing the incentive to disregard it.’ (Elkins v. United States, 364 US at 217) 46 WASHINGTON — In a sweeping victory for privacy rights in the digital age, the Supreme Court on Wednesday unanimously ruled that the police need warrants to search the cellphones of people they arrest. While the decision will offer protection to the 12 million people arrested every year, many for minor crimes, its impact will most likely be much broader. The ruling almost certainly also applies to searches of tablet and laptop computers, and its reasoning may apply to searches of homes and businesses and of information held by third parties like phone companies. “This is a bold opinion,” said Orin S. Kerr, a law professor at George Washington University. “It is the first computer-search case, and it says we are in a new digital age. You can’t apply the old rules anymore.” Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr., writing for the court, was keenly alert to the central role that cellphones play in contemporary life. They are, he said, “such a pervasive and insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an important feature of human anatomy.” But he added that old principles required that their contents be protected from routine searches. One of the driving forces behind the American Revolution, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, was revulsion against “general warrants,” which “allowed British officers to rummage through homes in an “The fact that technology now allows an individual to carry such information in his hand,” the chief justice also wrote, “does not make the information any less worthy of the protection for which the founders fought.” The government has been on a surprising losing streak in cases involving the use of new technologies by the police. In Wednesday’s case and in a 2012 decision concerning GPS devices, the Supreme Court’s precedents had supported the government. “But the government got zero votes in those two cases,” Professor Kerr said. The courts have long allowed warrantless searches in connection with arrests, saying they are justified by the need to protect police officers and to prevent the destruction of evidence. But Chief Justice Roberts said neither justification made much sense in the context of cellphones. While the police may examine a cellphone to see if it contains, say, a razor blade, he wrote, “once an officer has secured a phone 47 and eliminated any potential physical threats, however, data on the phone can endanger no one.” The possibility that evidence could be destroyed or hidden by “remote wiping” or encryption programs, Chief Justice Roberts wrote, was remote, speculative and capable of being addressed. The police may turn off a phone, remove its battery or place it in a bag made of aluminum foil. Should the police confront an authentic “now or never” situation, the chief justice wrote, they may well be entitled to search the phone under a separate strand of Fourth Amendment law, one concerning “exigent circumstances.” On the other side of the balance, Chief Justice Roberts said, is the data contained on typical cellphones. Ninety percent of Americans have them, he wrote, and they contain “a digital record of nearly every aspect of their lives — from the mundane to the intimate.” He wrote, “According to one poll, nearly three-quarters of smartphone users report being within five feet of their phones most of the time, with 12 percent admitting that they even use their phones in the shower.” Even the word cellphone is a misnomer, he said. “They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, Rolodexes, calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps or newspapers,” he wrote. Chief Justice Roberts acknowledged that the decision would make law enforcement more difficult. “Cellphones have become important tools in facilitating coordination and communication among members of criminal enterprises, and can provide valuable incriminating information about dangerous criminals,” he wrote. “Privacy comes at a cost.” But other technologies, he said, can make it easier for the police to obtain warrants. Using email and iPads, the chief justice wrote, officers can sometimes have a warrant in hand in 15 minutes. Ellen Canale, a spokeswoman for the Justice Department, said the department would work with its law enforcement agencies to ensure full compliance with the decision. The Supreme Court is occasionally criticized for its lack of technological savvy, but Chief Justice Roberts, 59, seemed fully familiar with what 48 smartphones can do. “The average smartphone user has installed 33 apps,” he wrote, “which together can form a revealing montage of the user’s life.” There are mobile applications, he said, for “Democratic Party news and Republican Party news,” for “alcohol, drug and gambling addictions,” for “sharing prayer requests” and for “tracking pregnancy symptoms.” Records from those applications, he added, “may be accessible on the phone indefinitely.” And yet more information, he said, may be available through cloud computing. “An Internet search and browsing history,” he wrote, “can be found on an Internet-enabled phone and could reveal an individual’s private interests or concerns — perhaps a search for certain symptoms of disease, coupled with frequent visits to WebMD. Data on a cellphone can also reveal where a person has been. Historic location information is a standard feature on many smartphones and can reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also within a particular building.” The court heard arguments in April in two cases on the issue, but issued a single decision. The first case, Riley v. California, No. 13-132, arose from the arrest of David L. Riley, who was pulled over in San Diego in 2009 for having an expired auto registration. The police found loaded guns in his car and, on inspecting his smartphone, entries they associated with a street gang. A more comprehensive search of the phone led to information that linked Mr. Riley to a shooting. He was later convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. A California appeals court said neither search had required a warrant. The second case, United States v. Wurie, No. 13-212, involved a search of the call log of the flip phone of Brima Wurie, who was arrested in 2007 in Boston and charged with gun and drug crimes. Last year, the federal appeals court in Boston threw out the evidence found on Mr. Wurie’s phone. News organizations, including The New York Times, filed a brief supporting Mr. Riley and Mr. Wurie in which they argued that cellphone searches can compromise news gathering. The Justice Department, in its Supreme Court briefs, said cellphones were not materially different from wallets, purses and address books. Chief Justice Roberts disagreed. 49 “That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially indistinguishable from a flight to the moon,” he wrote. Jeffrey L. Fisher, a lawyer for Mr. Riley, said the decision was a landmark. “The decision brings the Fourth Amendment into the 21st century,” he said. “The core of the decision is that digital information is different. It triggers privacy concerns far more profound than ordinary physical objects.” The Supreme Court’s decisions can be technical. This one was straightforward. What must the police do when they want to search a cellphone in connection with an arrest? “Get a warrant,” Chief Justice Roberts wrote. 50