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Contemporary Political Theory Contemporary Political Theory A Reader Edited by Colin Farrelly SAGE Publications London Thousand Oaks New Delhi Editorial material Colin Farrelly 2004 First published 2004 Apart from any fair dealing for the purposes of research or private study, or criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, this publication may be reproduced, stored or transmitted in any form, or by any means, only with the prior permission in writing of the publishers, or in the case of reprographic reproduction, in accordance with the terms of licences issued by the Copyright Licensing Agency. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside those terms should be sent to the publishers. SAGE Publications Ltd 1 Olivers Yard London EC1Y 1SP SAGE Publications Inc Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd B-42, Panchsheel Enclave Post Box 4109 New Delhi British Library Cataloguing in Publication data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN ISBN (pbk) Library of Congress Control Number Typeset by C&M Digitals (P) Ltd., Chennai, India Printed in Great Britain by Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wiltshire To my parents Contents Preface Acknowledgements ix x Part One Egalitarian-Liberalism 1 Introduction 3 1 John Rawls, Justice as Fairness 13 2 John C. Harsanyi, The Maximin Principle 22 3 Richard J. Arneson, Primary Goods Reconsidered 31 4 Alex Callinicos, Equality of What? 36 5 John Kekes, A Question for Egalitarians 45 Part Two Libertarianism 51 Introduction 53 6 Robert Nozick, The Entitlement Theory of Justice 61 7 Eric Mack, How Liberty Upsets Patterns 69 8 Robert E. Litan, On Rectification in Nozick s Minimal State 81 9 David Gauthier, Justice as Mutual Advantage Allen Buchanan, A Critique of Justice as Reciprocity 99 Part Three Communitarianism 107 Introduction Michael J. Sandel, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self Will Kymlicka, Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality Michael Walzer, Complex Equality 134 Part Four Republicanism 145 Introduction Philip Pettit, Freedom as Antipower Alan Patten, The Republican Critique of Liberalism James Bohman, Cosmopolitan Republicanism 169 viii Contents Part Five Feminism 179 Introduction Susan Moller Okin, The Public/Private Dichotomy Iris Marion Young, The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference Nancy Fraser, Recognition or Redistribution? 205 Part Six Deliberative Democracy 221 Introduction Iris Marion Young, The Deliberative Model Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process John S. Dryzek, Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy 242 Part Seven Multiculturalism 261 Introduction Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition Bhikhu Parekh, Equality of Difference Chandran Kukathas, Liberalism and Multiculturalism 288 Index 295 Preface Political theorists are primarily concerned with how we ought, collectively, to live together. A diverse range of political arrangements can, and have been, defended by reference to values such as justice, freedom, equality and democracy. The job of the political theorist is to bring some precision to these vague and contested concepts so that one can provide convincing arguments for the particular social arrangements they believe we should be aspiring towards. This Reader brings together a diverse array of contributions from theorists of different theoretical perspectives. I believe the positions covered in this volume egalitarian-liberalism, libertarianism, communitarianism, republicanism, feminism, deliberative democracy and multiculturalism not only cover the most significant theoretical debates in contemporary political theory, but the readings chosen will help motivate students to think critically about the different arguments political theorists have advanced. In each chapter I have included a brief introduction to help provide some background to the readings and the issues and topics covered by these different theoretical positions. Acknowledgements Arneson, Richard. Primary Goods Reconsidered, Nous, 24, 1990: [excerpts from pp. 429, ]. Bohman, James. Cosmopolitan Republicanism: Citizenship, Freedom and Global Political Authority, The Monist, 84(1), 2001: 3 21 [excerpts from pp. 3 5, 9 10, 12 19]. Buchanan, Allen. Justice as Reciprocity versus Subject-Centered Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs, 19(3), 1990: [excerpts from pp , ]. Callinicos, Alex. Equality. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000) [excerpts from pp ]. Dryzek, John. Legitimacy and Economy in Deliberative Democracy, Political Theory, 29(5), 2001: Fraser, Nancy. Recognition or Redistribution? A Critical Reading of Iris Young s Justice and the Politics of Difference, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 3(2), 1995: Gauthier, David. Morals by Agreement. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986) [excerpts from pp. 1 5, 13 19]. Gutmann, Amy and Thompson, Dennis. Deliberative Democracy Beyond Process, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 10(2), 2002: [excerpts from pp , , 174]. Harsanyi, John. Can the Maximin Principle Serve as a Basis for Morality? A Critique of John Rawls s Theory, American Political Science Review, 69, 1975: [excerpts from pp ]. Kekes, John. A Question for Egalitarians, Ethics, 107, 1997: [excerpts from pp ]. Kukathas, Chandran. Liberalism and Multiculturalism: The Politics of Indifference, Political Theory, 26(5), 1998: [excerpts from pp , , 698]. Kymlicka, Will. Liberal Individualism and Liberal Neutrality, Ethics, 99(4), 1989: [excerpts from , ]. Litan, Robert. On Rectification in Nozick s Minimal State, Political Theory, 5(2), 1977: [excerpts from pp , ]. Mack, Eric. Self-Ownership, Marxism and Egalitarianism: Part 1: Challenges to Historical Entitlement, Politics, Philosophy and Economics, 1(1), 2002: [excerpts from pp ]. Nozick, Robert. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. (New York: Basic Books, 1974) [excerpts from pp , , , , ]. Okin, Susan. Justice, Gender and the Family. (New York: Basic Books, 1989) [excerpts from pp ]. Acknowledgements xi Parekh, Bhikhu. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000) [excerpts from pp ]. Patten, Alan. The Republican Critique of Liberalism, British Journal of Political Science, 26, 1996: [excerpts from pp ]. Pettit, Phillip. Freedom as Antipower, Ethics, 106(3), 1996: [excerpts from pp ]. Rawls, John. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2001) [excerpts from pp. 5 11, 14 18, 41 43]. Sandel, Michael. The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self, Political Theory, 12(1), 1984: Taylor, Charles. The Politics of Recognition. In A. Gutmann (ed.), Multiculturalism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994) [excerpts from pp ]. Walzer, Michael. Spheres of Justice. (New York: Basic Books, 1983) [excerpts from pp. 3 12, 17 18]. Young, Iris Marion. The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, Social Theory and Practice, 12(1), 1986: 1 26 [excerpts from pp. 1 2, 14 23].. Inclusion and Democracy. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) [excerpts from pp ]. Part One: Egalitarian-Liberalism Introduction Over the course of the last thirty years there has emerged a distinctive brand of liberal political theory called egalitarian-liberalism. Egalitarian-liberals are primarily concerned with the issue of distributive justice; that is, how the benefits and burdens of social cooperation are to be distributed. As is evident by its name, egalitarian-liberals believe that liberty and equality are compatible political values and that the demands of these two values should be taken seriously when considering what the just division of burdens and benefits are. There is of course no consensus among egalitarianliberals concerning what distributive outcome constitutes the best complement of liberty and equality. As shall become evident in Chapter 4, liberals have adopted a negative conception of liberty that equates freedom with the absence of interference. 1 Liberals endorse the negative conception of liberty as it captures many of the central concerns they believe a just public philosophy should emphasise. For example, the idea of limited government, the importance of toleration and respect for individual autonomy. These concerns are core concerns of liberals. But egalitarian-liberals believe that the demands of justice go well beyond the demands of respecting the liberty of all. The value of equality is also a central concern, indeed some egalitarian-liberals argue that equality is the fundamental value of liberalism. 2 It is the egalitarian component of egalitarian-liberalism that has received the most attention (both positive and negative) from political philosophers in the past few decades. This first part begins with the most influential egalitarian-liberal John Rawls. In A Theory of Justice Rawls revitalised the social contract tradition of John Locke, Jean-Jacques Rousseau and Immanuel Kant. Rawls defends the theory he calls justice as fairness. Justice as fairness is primarily concerned with the way in which major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social cooperation (Rawls, 1999: 6). 3 As such, justice as fairness is a theory designed to apply to what Rawls calls the basic structure the political, social and economic institutions of society. It provides a normative ideal by which we are to judge the political constitution of society and the principal economic and social arrangements. The just society, according to justice as fairness, is one governed by the two principles of justice. These principles are: (a) (b) Each person has the same indefensible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all (equal basic liberties principle). Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (fair equality of opportunity principle); and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (difference principle). 4 Contemporary Political Theory The principles are presented in lexical order. This means that they are listed in order of priority. The equal basic liberties principle must be satisfied before the second principle is invoked and the fair equality of opportunity principle must be satisfied before the difference principle can be invoked. Rawls argues that the two principles of justice would be the principles parties in an impartial choice situation would choose as the principles to govern their society. This impartial choice situation is called the original position. The parties in this original position are placed behind a veil of ignorance so that knowledge of things like one s social position and natural talents cannot influence their choice of the principles of justice. In such a scenario Rawls believes the parties would choose the two principles of justice over the principle of utility. In Contemporary Ethics: Taking Account of Utilitarianism William Shaw claims that two fundamental ideas underlie utilitarianism: first, that the results of our actions are the key to their moral evaluation, and second, that one should assess and compare those results in terms of the happiness they cause (or more broadly, in terms of their impact on people s well-being) (Shaw, 1999: 2). When stated like this it is easy to see why utilitarianism has enjoyed an eminent list of devotees that includes David Hume, Adam Smith, Jeremy Bentham and J.S. Mill. It captures some of our most basic moral intuitions concerning the importance of, for example, impartiality and human welfare. Utilitarians have put forth diverse accounts of what constitutes happiness, or utility, but they share the belief that the best outcome is the one that maximises overall happiness or utility. In A Theory of Justice Rawls invokes two main concepts of ethics the right and the good in order to illustrate how his contractarian theory differs from utilitarianism. The structure of an ethical theory, claims Rawls, is largely determined by how it defines and connects these two basic notions (Rawls, 1999: 21). Rawls distinguishes between the following two ways of relating the right and the good. The first way is to define the good independently from the right, and then the right as that which maximises the good. Suppose, for example, one defines the good as material prosperity. If we accept this definition of the good then we can determine which laws and policies are the right ones by simply choosing the institutional arrangement that will bring about the greatest level of material prosperity. Institutions and acts are right if, of the available alternatives, they produce the most good. Rawls calls this type of theory a teleological theory. It is contrasted with a deontological theory. Deontological theories can be defined as theories that either do not specify the good independently from the right, or do not interpret the right as maximising the good (Rawls, 1999: 26). Rawls wants to defend a theory that is deontological in this second sense, that is, it gives a priority of the right over the good. The appeal of the deontological position can be brought out by considering the example noted above. A teleological theory instructs us to maximise the good. If we define the good as material prosperity, for example, the institutions of our society should be designed to maximise overall material prosperity. But such a goal may be pursued by measures we think are unjust. Maximising overall material prosperity might justify restricting the number of children people can have or forcing people to do jobs they are best suited to do but do not want to do. By asserting a priority of the right over the good Rawls seeks to avoid the injustices which may be made in the name of maximising utility. As Rawls puts it, each person possesses an inviolability Introduction 5 founded on justice that even the welfare of society as a whole cannot override (Rawls, 1999: 3) The main target of Rawls s critique is the classical utilitarian doctrine espoused by Jeremy Bentham and Henry Sidgwick. This version maintains that society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed over all the individuals belonging to it (Rawls, 1999: 20). Such an approach extends what is a commonsensical approach to the principle of choice for one person to the principle of choice for an association of people. Rawls explains how, as a principle of choice for one person, the utilitarian ethic seems like a rational ethic: Each man in realising his own interests is certainly free to balance his own losses against his own gains. We may impose a sacrifice on ourselves now for the sake of a greater advantage later. A person quite properly acts, at least when others are not affected, to achieve his own greatest good, to advance his rational ends as far as possible. (Rawls, 1999: 21) But the reasoning that is appropriate for the choice of one person should not, argues Rawls, be extended to the choice for an association of people. But this is what utilitarianism does. In doing so it does not take seriously the distinction between persons. There are some things we should not do to people, even if doing it achieves the greatest net balance of satisfaction for all. In particular, Rawls argues that in a just society the basic liberties are taken for granted and the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or to the calculus of social interests (Rawls, 1999: 25). Utilitarianism treats questions of distributive justice as questions of efficient administration. The nature of the decision made by the ideal legislator is not, therefore, materially different from that of an entrepreneur deciding how to maximise his profit by producing this or that commodity, or that of a consumer deciding how to maximise his satisfaction by the purchase of this or that collection of goods (Rawls, 1999: 24). But justice, claims Rawls, must trump the virtue of efficiency. The right is prior to the good. Justice denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater good shared by others. The first excerpt in this part is from Rawls s recent re-statement of the theory of justice as fairness. Rawls revised various parts of his theory over the course of a quarter of a century and the excerpt covers some of the central aspects of his account including his discussion of society as a fair system of cooperation and the original position. The second excerpt considers the utilitarian reply to Rawls s argument. John Harsyani focuses on Rawls s discussion of the maximin strategy. This strategy instructs the parties in the original position to evaluate possible institutional arrangements in terms of how well the least advantaged fare and opt for the scheme that maximises the prospects of the members of this group. The two principles of justice ensure that the interests of the least advantaged are better secured than they would be in a society governed by the principle of utility and thus Rawls believes it is rational to choose the two principles of justice. But Harsanyi questions whether it is rational to abide by the dictates of the principle of maximin. Richard Arneson focuses on Rawls s difference principle in the excerpt from Primary Goods Reconsidered. Arneson, an egalitarian, is concerned with the scope 6 Contemporary Political Theory Rawls leaves for the issue of personal responsibility when he defines the least advantaged with respect to the primary goods 4 individuals possess. According to Rawls s difference principle, membership in the category of the least advantaged appears to be settled in terms of primary goods that individuals enjoy over the course of their lives and this, argues Arneson, has counterintuitive consequences. He illustrates this with the example of the life choices of four individuals Smith, Black, Jones, and Johnson. Smith and Black both graduate from an elite law school with high grades and can choose among several career options. Black chooses to be a Wall Street lawyer, the work is stressful but the income is high. Smith opts for the life of a bohemian artist, the income is meagre but the work is like play. Jones and Johnson did not go to college and both graduated from formal schooling with very little in terms of marketable skills. Jones chooses to be a bohemian artist and Johnson an unskilled labourer. According to Rawls s definition of the least advantaged, Smith is one of the least advantaged. That is, his income falls below both the median income and that which the unskilled worker would get. The difference principle requires us to maximise the prospects of the least advantaged and both Smith and Johnson are members of this group. But our moral intuitions tell us that these two individuals should not be treated the same. Smith had lots of opportunities. With his law degree he could have chosen a variety of jobs that would have secured him a high income. But he chose to be a bohemian artist and the low level of subsistence that comes with it. This contrasts with Johnson. Due to his low level of marketable skills he never had a choice between high income and low income jobs. In addition to this, he chose to work for a living doing hard labour rather than live the life of a bohemian artist. Johnson is one of the deserving poor, argues Arneson, while Smith is not. Smith is poor by choice and thus should not receive the same benefits that Johnson receives. Justice does not require us to compensate individuals for inequalities they have voluntarily chosen. Rawls s attempt to combine considerations of liberty with those of equality has inspired political t
