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Sociological Theory and Sociological PracticeAuthor(s): Thomas KurtzSource: Acta Sociologica, Vol. 50, No. 3 (Sep., 2007), pp. 283-294Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd. Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20460003 . Accessed: 05/03/2014 21:42 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact
[email protected]. . Sage Publications, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to ActaSociologica. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Wed, 5 Mar 2014 21:42:51 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions external to = di luar ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2007 Sociological Theory and Sociological Practice Thomas Kurtz Osnabruick University, Germany abstract: This article is concerned with the question of the relevance of the results of sociological research external to the discipline - or, in other words, with the form of dealing with sociological knowledge in the environment of the scientific system. When it comes to application, compared to other disciplines sociology has an unusual problem: Unlike jurisprudence or economics, which focus primarily on one specific social function system, sociology is characterized by a strictly external observation perspective and produces extemal descriptions of what the disciplines of the individual function systems have already put forward as self-descriptions. Based on these reflections, this article asks about the consequences for sociological theory and practice and sees one possible answer in viewing sociology as a form of advisory sociology. keywords: advisory sociology * outside description * profession* sociological knowledge * sociological practice * systems theory I. Introduction Sociology is frequently onfronted ith widespread lamentations f irrelevance ot just y the public but also within the discipline itself, sking: 'What is the point of sociology today?' Furthermore, here s talk of a crisis due to the ack of relevance f the results f sociological research xternal to the discipline. However, in contrast o these problems, the more recent results f knowledge application research mphasize, as its most important mpirical finding, the proof that the factual application of social sciences and in particular of sociological knowledge has been drastically nderestimated Beck nd Bont, 1989). While in ts eginnings the practical success rate of the social sciences was viewed sceptically Stehr, 992), since the 1960s a continual diffusion f the knowledge of the ocial sciences nto he most diverse social areas, organizations nd Lebenswelten ('life-worlds') an be observed. Indeed, one can even speak of an increasing social scientification of the most diverse spheres of life in society. This can be seen especially in the political sphere when the reference o social scientific easoning is either sed as a basis for olitical decision-making r referred o as a basis for egitimizing political decisions in the areas of education, law and economy. Every political party has its own scientific ourt reporter elivering ppropriate results nd presenting hem n the mass media as much-needed. Two reasons in particular can be put forward explaining the immense spread of social scien tific deas, which can certainly be viewed as a success story of the social sciences: First, the broad ening of the social scientific study programmes since the 1970s and the resulting increasing presence of social scientifically ducated practitioners n practice reas outside of universities; and second, the absorption of social scientific nowledge by the mass media, which, in its constant search for new information, first found what it was looking for in the natural sciences Acta Sociologica * September 007 * Vol 50(3): 283-294 * DOI: 10.1177/0001699307080933 Copyright ) 2007 Nordic ociological Association Published y SAGE (Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore) www.sagepublications.com This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Wed, 5 Mar 2014 21:42:51 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Acta Sociologica 0(3) and then n the humanities and social sciences. In connection with these developments, the social sciences have become a part not only of the specialized knowledge of specific ccu pations, but also of the ndividual cultural capital of a broad middle class.2 Hence, it would not be misguided to speak of a daily social scientification f everyday ife. he extent o which the iffusion f the ocial sciences has led to rationalization f social and individual roblem processing or whether social scientific nowledge is only used strikingly nd metaphorically is another uestion - one need merely think f the se of the term knowledge ociety' n the media-informed ublic to illustrate his. Thus, although the ocial sciences re certainly resent n public discourse (Lazarsfeld t al., 1967), it s possible to ascertain certain eficit n identifying hem Wingens, 997).3 here is a demand for and in a sense also use of the social sciences in occupational practice, but even when they re used the nitial form f the knowledge as produced in the social sciences can no longer e identified, nd in application research ne can search for the ost sociology see Kroner and Wolff, 1984). And this earch, r rather he proof of the ffect f this knowledge, becomes all the more difficult ith decreasing transparency f the paths or detours that this knowledge has taken ver its ourney through he mass media and the public. The difficulty in making social scientific roducts visible can already be explained by the simple fact that the ocial sciences, n contrast o the natural sciences, o not deliver hard facts r discoveries, but rather primarily provide interpretations Felt, 2000). And in the broad public, these interpretations re often reduced to specific erms, ictures or metaphors. In the following, limit myself to concentrating n the area in which one is most likely o find ociological knowledge rather han ttempting o identify ll the laces where one might detect sociology. his area is the pplication of sociological knowledge to concrete ases in the occupational action of sociologically ducated practitioners. owever, before doing this, et me make a brief omment n social scientific pplication research. II. Knowledge and action Although social scientists ere taken nto ervice n the USA in the ourse of the psychologi cal warfare even before and during the Second World War, in particular by politicians and the military, he systematic esearch nto the pplication contexts f social scientific nowledge first began in the post-war period. However, for a long time, this period was dominated by a naive, almost completely ncritical ransfer entality, ed by the dea of a causal-technological knowledge transfer rom cience to the pragmatic ction field f occupations, s paradigmat ically formulated n the phrase 'knowledge informs ction'. Scientific nowledge was auto matically attested uperiority ver practical ction knowledge, and the relevance f sociology as a science for ractical action attributed o its greater rationality. ith the use of scientific knowledge, which in these concepts was principally nterpreted eductively as a top-down relation see Beck and BonfR, 984), the so-called unscientific orld of practice was to be brought up to the dealized rationality tandard of science in order to function etter.4 A turning-point s marked by Charles Lindblom's (1959) thesis of muddling through, ith which the realization that the production of scientific nowledge follows different ules than its pplication in practice increasingly ound cknowledgement. y the 1980s, the traditional transfer oncepts had been replaced by more differentiated ransformation odels. These models hold, in a somewhat oversimplified manner, that scientific nowledge generated through research, which is mediated - and if all works out well: also appropriated - in universities must be reshaped and recontextualized n its way into occupational practice. These transformation oncepts thus reacted to the tructural ifferences etween scientific nd practical ction knowledge that ad already been attested y phenomenology. nspired y the concept of everyday ife f the erstehende 'understanding') ociology f Alfred Schutz (1974; 284 This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Wed, 5 Mar 2014 21:42:51 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions Kurtz: Sociological heory nd Sociological ractice Schuizt nd Luckmann, 1979), the dea of a rationality ap between science and practice was abandoned, as was the ntention o steer ractice with scientific heories n a causal-technical manner, s practice tself as interpreted s theory nd knowledge laden. chutz (1971) distin guishes between first-order nd second-order onstructs. irst-order onstructs mply ction orientations f direct relevance n the form f everyday knowledge, which itself s a result f everyday situations of practice with pragmatic action relevance. n contrast, econd-order constructs, hich Schutz reserved nly for cience, bserve problems external o science with a higher degree of generality nd describe them ith the help of a terminological ramework. Social scientific econstruction nd interpretations f practice re in this ense always second order constructs nd typifications, r, n other words: constructs f the onstructs f practical action. n the transformation odels of application research, his ine f thought as continued and led to n interpretation f social scientific nowledge not as superior ut rather s merely different see, for this oint, Nassehi, 2003: 310 ff.). III. Self-description nd outside description These application theoretical eflections enerally ddress the social sciences. Beyond this, n the disciplinary context of society, ociology as a social science has a unique standing in research nd education among the ther social sciences. The fact hat ociology acks clearly defined occupational practice external to science is always given as an explanation for this unique standing, ut the main reason can be more precisely determined ased on the differ entiation etween self-description nd outside description. s an editorial ote explicating he meaning of description, et t t this oint be said that escription n this ontext efers o the textual fixation f observations. lthough sociology can operate as the self-description nd self-observation f society, f the scientific ystem nd of itself s a discipline - and in this sense the reflections resented here are of course also self-descriptions f sociology in all other cases sociology produces a description of its environment, hich entails a distanced perspective of its object of observation as it is separated from hat object by social system borders. Sociology is thus distinctly ifferent n the form f its perspective of observation from he disciplines of pedagogy, political science, urisprudence nd economics (Kurtz, 000a). These social sciences are theories f reflections n the sense of self-description odels as theories f the system n the system. hus, they re themselves art of the communication rocesses of the respective unction ystems hey bserve, describe nd characterize n the form f theories. With reference o the regulation nd orientation roblems of the function ystems, eflection theories re self-referentially onnected to their bjects. n accepting the key differentiation f their research object - for example law/injustice in the legal system - they at the same time incorporate hemselves nto these ystems nd offer description that finds resonance n the communication f the system tself see Luhmann and Schorr, 000). In this process, they therefore dentify hemselves ith the institutions nd goals of the systems nd, regarding plausibility nd motivation, re located n a continuum ith the bserved system Kieserling, 2004), so that he described finds tself ell catered for n the description. his, however, does not mean that his elf-description an get by without reference o science. Reflection heories also communicate heir esults n the form f scientific ublications n science, ut at the ame time they are bound to their object in the sense that they do not merely engage in distanced research bout their bject but are simultaneously lso engaged in researchfor heir bject. In contrast, ociology for hich, for xample, Theodor W. Adorno reclaimed he title The Party of Enlightenment Aufklarung)' nd Niklas Luhmann the title Science of the Second Glance' - takes strictly xternal bservation erspective nd has produced descriptions f that which the eflection heories f the function ystems ave already resented s self-descriptions. 285 This content downloaded from 129.78.72.28 on Wed, 5 Mar 2014 21:42:51 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
