Transcript
The Emergence of Class Consciousness: Lukács on Ojetive Possiility Nishad Patnaik The current historical juncture, where on the one hand, we are witnessing the re-emergence of an atavistic fascism, and on the other, pockets of mostly fragmented progressive resistance, within a otet oditioed the pheoeo of gloalizatio i its aious diesios, leds th e question of political pais a particular urgency and complexity. The forces at play in the current situation, and theefoe politis its elf, open/s once again, the problematics conditioned by the entire nexus of interconnected binaries of empirical and rational history, contingency and necessity, freedom and determinism, individual and collective agency etc.; yet in a manner that seems to resist their theorizations, not only in the liberal tradition, which Marx had already critiqued based on its manifold modes of reification (for instance, in the form of the reified conception of the atioal, autooous, individual subject), but in the Marxist tradition as well, at least in its standardized, dominant interpretation. In this paper, I will revisit the question of the possibility of political praxis by turning to Lukács analyses of reification and class consciousness. The central question of this paper, upon which all other issues turn, would be: is a proletarian class consciousness in the Marxist sense still possible? Can we still admit a class (self) consciousness that, in relation to all previous modes of consciousness, and in particular, to the bourgeois mode of consciousness, which despite a certain inherent perspicuity, is ultimately limited by the opacity ( fo itself of its own class interests, breaks through to a consciousness of the hole— to the dialectical movement of history, and therefore, to a uiesal disiteested perspective constitutive of a classless society? This guiding question would orchestrate my analysis of the themes that Lukács delimits through the series questions he poses at the beginning of his essay, concerning the nature and practical function of class consciousness, its qualitatively different modalities vis-à-vis different classes, and its gradations within the proletariat. i The question I have posed, gains its problematic urgency in the contemporary political and socio-economic situation. For the latter seems to present a challenge to a foulai Marxist understanding of a deterministic dialectical unfolding of history, resulting in the simplification and transparency of class antagonisms that come to be crystalized under capitalism, in the fundamental antagonism between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. This in turn, is supposed to result in the emergence of a revolutionary proletarian self-consciousness that ultimately achieves a truly universal, objective standpoint on the (immanent) totality of the social, thus on itself, and constitutes the basis for its own self-transcendence as a class through its self-conscious coincidence with itself in a classless society. The challenge to this uit of the sujet ad ojet of histo, ee as a teleologial possibility, consists precisely in the contemporary emergence of fascist tendencies from within a set of historical circumstances that conform to the conditions of capitalist crisis, and thus ought, according to the dominant Marxist interpretation of the necessary dialectical unfolding of reason, lead to the formation of a revolutionary proletarian (self)-consciousness. For instance, some commentators have interpreted both the Brexit vote and the victory of Donald Trump, to take just two recent events, as a reaction against the neoliberal economic dimension of globalization. Despite the differences between the two events, their continuity stems, it is argued, from the deleterious effects of the globalization of finance capital, which in its quest for speculative or direct gains, moves across the planet, seeking iestet oppotuities. This oilit of fiae eates ueploet ad stagatio n in the wages of workers (which reciprocally reinforce each other) in advanced capitalist countries, by tying their wages to those in the developing world. Simultaneously, it also generates unemployment and economic distress for petty producers (artisans, craftsmen, weavers etc.) and small scale farmers, which constitute the vast majority of the working population in developing countries, through a process of dispossession ad disefahiseet. Dispossessio ous though the appopiatio of lad, a tural resources etc. by multinational corporations on the one hand, and on the other, the economies of scale, productivity of labor etc., they bring to bear, which end up forcing small producers out of their traditional occupations (since they are no longer economically viable), adding to the ranks of the unemployed and udeeploed. Disefahiseet i a politial ad ethial sese, ous sie ude the oditios of the ideologial hegeo of eoliealis, the atue of state -intervention changes, from one ostensibly in favor of the majority of its citizens to one that openly protects the interests of finance. If states opete ith eah othe to attat Foeig Diet Iestet FDI, ad the latte ostitutes the ol oeptio of deelopet, the o atte hih pat is oted ito poe, the eooi policies pursued by the government (privatization, deregulation, austerity measures etc.), remain more or less the same. This implies, in effect, a curtailment of the democratic process. Since these are the very circumstances that give rise to proletarian self-consciousness and yet also tend towards fascism (the historical examples may be multiplied, as we know from the analyses of the experience of Germany and Italy, following the great depression), one may ask, can the teleological model of dialectical reason, with its emphasis on the necessity of the movement of historical consciousness through a process of internal contradiction ii , withstand this moment of radical contingency/indeterminacy? It is against the background of this problematic that Cal “hitts atiulatio of the politial i tes of the distitio etee fied ad ee sees to attai a etai n force. For Schmitt, the friend/enemy distinction is constitutive of the specifically political, insofar as it is irreducible to any other ethial, aestheti o eooi atitheses, suh as good/eil , eautiful/ugl, pofitale/upofitale o r any combination of these. The irreducibility of the antithesis fied/ee, hethe it eists theoetiall o patiall, atiulates Politis as a elatiel independent domain — not wholly cut off, but as representing an intensification to the poi t of the ost etee ad itese atagois, hih a o a ot ioke othe atitheses. The ee eed ot e eil although he usuall aies the eotioal hage of eig eil, et, as “hitt ites, He is eetheless, the othe, the stage, ad … i a specially intense way, existentially soethig diffeet ad alie …. iii In relation to the thematic of this study, this characterization of politics forces a fundamental question, namely, instead of speaking of a universal political consciousness and praxis, must we accept politics as othig ut resentment o atagois ? This empiricisation of political consciousness would imply, in interna l oheee ith “hitts othe remarks (and in keeping with his critique of liberalism as diluting the specificity of the antagonism intrinsic to politics) that the specifically political moment is alas oete, ultiatel otiget, ad theefoe also outside, o ieduile to the losue of easo; hih ould ilude the oeptio of histoial easo i the Maist sese. That the present historical juncture, with the re-emergence of overlapping racial, religious and xenophobic antagonisms on the world stage, seems to lend credence to such a conception of the political, seems obvious. I will argue against the seeming obviousness of such a position by turning to some of Luká s writings; ut ot i ode to sipl eistate its opposite pole, ael a pue atioalis. As I noted, the latter, on the formulaic interpretation of Marx/Hegel, involves a historical determinism, apparently iheet i the oeptio of a dialetial ufoldig of histo ehid the aks of hua agets, alog ith the stageist udestadig of histoial tasfoatio, uliatig i a soiet fully transparent to itself; that is, where historical reason finally becomes fully (self) aware of its own inner dialectical la of oeet, suh that othig is left i the shados, as the uthought soue of its o becoming. The philosophical critique, within the broadly liberal tradition, of such an interpretation is by o uite ell ko. This itiue, daig fo Heidegges itigs, ut atiulated i diese theoetial otets ude the ui of the itiue of a etaphsis of pesee, thikes suh as Jacque Derrida, Claude Lefort, Ernesto Laclau and Chantel Mouffe amongst others, points to the speifiall odeist, iaet fo of totalitaiais iv that is said to result from the teleological directedness of historical reason towards reflective self- oiidee o self pesee. Yet, following Luká s eadig , I will argue that such a critique does not maintain the nuances of the poleatis that Mas itigs iauguate. It is ot that many of these thinkers do not recognize points of ambiguity i Mas itigs that hit at a oe ople pitue tha the usual oe of a history governed by a deterministic dialectic. Yet, they do so in a manner that tends to reduce these ambiguities to an either-or choice, at least in relation to Marx, and then provide their analyses as radical alternatives, incapable of being accommodated within a dialectical logic. For instance, Ernesto Laclau poits to a asi shis i Mas oeptio of histo that igs to light a lternative and iopatile oeptios of the dialetial oeet of histo; oe deteied the otaditio between the forces of production and the relations of production, and the other by class antagonisms, which under capitalism crystalize in the explicit antagonism between the capitalist and the worker. v For Lalau atagois represents a moment of contingency, which indicates a non- atioal outside that aot e aoodated iside the losue of dialetial atioal otaditio etween the apitalist ad oke, osideed eel as depesoalized eooi ategoies. Yet, this outside of atagois hile lokig the losue of easo, that is, the idetit of the iside vi through its re-appropriation, is constitutive of such identity and of social identities as such. … a decent standard of living is impossible when wages fall below a certain level; and the fluctuations in the labour market affect housing conditions or the workers access to consumer goods. In this case however, the conflict is not internal to capitalist relations of production (in which the worker counts merely as the seller of labour power), but takes place between the relations of production and the workers identity outside them. … the constitutive outside is inherent to any antagonistic relationship. vii Here Lalau thiks of atagois pue egatio, otige, liit, diffeee et. as the constitutive outside of dialetial elatioal idetities, hih remains implicit, and is immediately re- appopiated ito the losue of dialetial elatioalit ua otaditio, in Marx s itigs . viii This allows Laclau to find only two strictly symmetrical and incompatible alternative conceptions of history in Mar . As he puts it, Fo histo to e gasped oeptuall as a atioal ad oheet poess, atagois ust e edued to otaditio. ix “ie this does ot otai, … histo, ased o the necessary development of productive forces, is faced with an outside hih stips it of a ultiate atioal oheee. x However, I would argue that if Marx, at times, enacts the process of reification (in the lai to epistei self - oiidee that opens the possibility of the formation of a iaet totalitarian state xi ), and thus replicates the very logic of reification that he identifies in capitalist production and its emergence from past historical formations, then in posing this sharp contrast etee a iside ad a outside, etee a asolutel atioalist histo ad the oet of pue atagois, otige et., despite ephasizig the ostitutie haate this outside, Lalau perpetrates a similar mode of reification in his reading of Marx. In contrast, I will contend, by underscoring certain aspects of Lukács discussion that Marx s thought has sufficient resources to recognize the inevitability of reification — of the transformation of ee ode of diffeee of lao, lass atagois et. ito its eified epesetatio. Co nsequently, in relation to Laclau, I will ephasize ot the outside o a diffeetial liit of otige, atagois et. as it udeies atioalit, ut the ae i hih it sustais dialetial easo, hih he ot recognized qua dialectical, leads to reification. For instance, in the passage I cited from Laclau, it is not simply the case that conflict/antagonism lies between relations of production and the workers identity outside them , hee the idetit i uestio is relatively inessential to, or independent of, the relations of production; rather, as Marx argues in Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts , the oflit etee the worker and the capitalist stems from the possibility that should it go unchecked, wages will fall below the levels required to sustain or reproduce the workers capacity to labour, thus, the capacity to otiue to oup the eooi atego selle of laou poe. Yet, if this occurs then, in principle (in practice, the reserve army of labour esues a sueeze o okes ages ad also their substitutability), the formal relations of production (not only the worker , ut also the apitalist, as the oe of the eas of podutio, ease to eist. The otaditio ithi apitalis, in this sense, consists in the self-defeating character of its processes, which are self-defeating precisely because they oe up agaist the ateial asis of laou poe, of commodities as use value, etc., or, in Luká s terminology, the necessary und epiig of uatit o ualit. Thus, if as Laclau claims, Marx co flates (logical) contradiction and (contingent, extra-logical) antagonism, it is because for Marx (just as for Hegel) , otaditio is not strictly formal but is ultimately based on the material conditions of production. Thus, Marx can claim,
